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ARTICLES
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: CORPORATE "GREENWASHING" OR A
CORPORATE CULTURE GAME CHANGER?
Hope M Babcock*
You know a cultural movement is real when the money
men get on board. In just the past year a broad swath of
financiers - venture capitalists, hedge funds, investment
banks, public pension funds, and even stodgy insurers have begun sinking billions of dollars into producers of
ethanol, fuel cell superbatteries, microscopic bugs that turn
glucose into plastic, environmentally friendly pesticides,
anything that might tap into the green craze. Saving the
planet, protecting America, doing God's work, cynically
exploiting a feel-good trend - call it what you will. Wall
Street sees money to be made.'
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The ideas reflected
in this paper were first presented at the Fordham Envtl. Law Review, Symposium,
Environmental Lawsuits & Corporate & Social Responsibility: The Role of
Litigation in Promoting Good Environmental Practice, held on March 5, 2010.
Although I have written several articles on individual responsible environmental
behavior, see n. 5, until now I have never tackled the topic of corporate
environmental responsibility. I wish to single out for especial thanks my colleague
Gregory Klass, without whose assistance the idea of using warranties as an
enforcement mechanism, developed in Part VII, would never have crossed my
mind. Any errors I have made in giving content to his suggestion are entirely my
own.
1. Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and the New Environmentalism, 31
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 291, 314-15 (2007) (quoting Emily
Thornton & Adam Aston, Wall Street's New Love Affair: Why Some of the World's
SmartestInvestors are Betting Billions on Clean Energy, Bus. WK., Aug. 14, 2006,
at 48).
*
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INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on the extent to which unenforceable voluntary
initiatives undertaken by corporations can change corporate behavior
to make businesses more environmentally responsible, i.e. not only
comply with the law, but to do more than the law actually requires of
them. 3 These initiatives, loosely gathered under the umbrella of a
movement called corporate social responsibility (CSR), are often
proposed by the government as a way to fill regulatory and
enforcement gaps or by industry, often as an alternative to regulatory
requirements. In each case, their goal is to improve the compliance
record of businesses and, in some cases, to achieve a higher level of
environmental performance. Based on a closer look at some of these
initiatives and their design flaws, this article concludes that these
voluntary programs, even when properly designed, should only
function as supplements, not replacements, to existing regulatory
programs and will only be effective if judicially enforceable by third
parties.
To develop this idea, the first part of the article very briefly
discusses the regulatory problems, including the ineffectiveness of
federal enforcement, that have, to some extent, spurred a turn towards
corporate self-regulation and the emergence of the concept of CSR.
The second part of the article looks more closely at corporate culture
and asks what about it makes businesses seemingly indifferent to
2. Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive
Social Movements, 76 TuL. L. REv. 1227, 1251-52 (2002) (quoting Milton
Friedman, A FriedmanDoctrine the Social Responsibility ofBusiness Is to Increase
Profits,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 32).
3. The scope of the paper is confined to suits brought against business firms
for violations of federal laws and does not examine suits brought under state
common law, such as nuisance suits.
4. See Robin Bravender, Voluntary Programs Under Scrutiny as Regulatory
Obligations Rise, GREENWIRE,
Feb.
5,
201 0,at
1, available at
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/02/05/1
(quoting
Assistant
Administrator Gina McCarthy as saying "[t]here are many areas where the past
administrations have been less willing to move forward with regulatory
requirements, and we are willing and they are the better strategy").
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being seen as "good environmental citizens." One thing that emerges
from this discussion is that shame and compliance sanctions levied
against the corporations are imperfect motivators when it comes to
overcoming the institutional pressure on firms to make a profit for
their shareholders.s
The third part of the article discusses the CSR movement more
broadly, its origins and the likelihood that it is not disappearing any
time soon; while the fourth part discusses some of the potential
benefits of CSR programs to corporations and society as a whole,
including their latent capacity to change corporate attitudes towards
the environment. The fifth part of the article turns to three examples
of voluntary CSR programs: information disclosure programs;
voluntary performance standards; and environmental management
systems (EMSs). Studies show that these programs have been largely
ineffective, creating the perception that firms undertake them
principally for public relations purposes and not to achieve any real
change in corporate behavior let alone social benefit. This part
examines three principle problems with these programs; specifically,
the absence of any internal or external monitoring of their
effectiveness, their lack of public transparency, and the absence of
sanctions or other consequences for businesses or their employees
who promise to undertake a CSR initiative and then fail to do so or
only support the initiative in a half-hearted way. However, given the
problems with regulatory programs set out in Part I, properly
designed and enforceable CSR programs that function as supplements
to existing regulatory programs may be the best way to change

5. This part of the article draws on work I have done previously on corporate
behavior as background for articles on individual environmental responsibility. See,
Hope M. Babcock, Responsible Environmental Behavior, Energy Conservation,
and Compact Fluorescent Bulbs: You Can Lead a Horse to Water, But Can You
Make It Drink?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 943 (2009) [hereinafter Babcock, Responsible
Environmental Behavior]; Hope M. Babcock, Civic Republicanism Provides
Theoretical Supportfor Making IndividualsMore Environmentally Responsible, 23
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 515 (2009); Hope M. Babcock, Assuming
Personal Responsibilityfor Improving the Environment: Moving Toward a New
EnvironmentalNorm, 33 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (2009) [hereinafter Babcock,
Assuming PersonalResponsibility];Hope M. Babcock, Global Climate Change: A
Civic Republican Moment for Achieving Broader Changes in Environmental
Behavior, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (2009).
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corporate culture because they work within, not outside, the
corporation. 6
The sixth part of the article reviews possible design changes that
might be made in these initiatives to overcome the flaws identified in
Part V; however, as this part shows, it is unlikely that businesses,
without being ordered, will change their CSR programs because of
the attendant costs. Accordingly, the final part of the article
discusses the importance of litigation as a means to improve the
design of CSR programs and compel their implementation. Two
types of lawsuits are discussed: one, the typical citizen enforcement
suit, which presumes the inclusion of the company's CSR initiative
into its regulatory permit when undertaken to gain the benefits of
some EPA CSR program; the other, a suit brought in state court
employing contract principles.
Neither approach is without
problems. Yet, both offer the opportunity for real reform. Indeed the
mere threat of such lawsuits can induce companies to change their
behavior to avoid the costs of defending against them and the
unwanted publicity; once filed, there is a possibility of settlement,
where structural changes can be made to the business' operation to
include a more robust CSR program.

I.

HOLES IN THE REGULATORY NET

There is little question that industry continues to be a major
contributor to the nation's pollutant loadings and environmental
degradation,7 even though recently contributions by individuals have

6. Peter Dobkin Hall, Business Giving and Social Investment in the United
States, 1790-1995, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 789, 817 (1996-1997) ("examinations of
the fundamental character of capitalism - not merely as an economic system, but as
a culture - offer[] a wealth of understandings about the interrelationships of
economic, social, political, and governmental institutions").
7. See, e.g., Cl imateWire, Study Says Businesses Cause $2.2 Trillion in
Environmental

Damage,

CLIMATEWIRE,

Feb.

19,

2010,

available

at

http//:www.eenews.net/climatewire/print/2010/02/19/7
(a recent study by a
London-based consulting firm, Trucost, which based on an examination of 3,000 of
the world's largest companies, estimated these companies would lose about a third
of their profits, or $2.2 trillion, "if they were held accountable for environmental
damage" caused by their activities).
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come under closer scrutiny. Some of these contributions come from
unregulated sources of pollution, like runoff from farms and urban
areas, and others are attributable to excess consumerism, which
induces industry to consume huge quantities of raw materials, energy,
and water and to produce substantial waste to meet consumer
demand. 9 Other harms result from regulatory restrictions that are too
lenient'o or from violations of those limits."
Distinct from less
developed countries, like Mexico where "a long history of
inexpensive energy, unfettered access to resources that contributed to
their squandering, and the irresponsible handling of residual products
and other waste matter," has left "a great deal of room for relatively
'easy' improvements to environmental outcomes,"l 2 the pollution
problems that remain in this country are expensive and difficult to
control let alone eliminate.' 3 Thus, while the country's air and rivers
are cleaner, the remaining pollution continues to be a national health

concern. 14

8. See, e.g., Babcock, Assuming PersonalResponsibility, supra note 5, at 11924 (discussing the contribution of individuals to pollutant loadings and loss of
natural resources).
9. Id. at 122-23 ("excessive consumerism").
10. Cf Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection:
Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 307, 318 (2004)
("some social actors, typically environmental nongovernmental organizations,
believe legal requirements to be inadequate to protect health and the environment,
and therefore demand behavior that extends beyond legal requirements").
11. David W. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior Through Environmental
Management Systems, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 80 (2007)
("Corporate noncompliance with regulatory requirements is described as
'pervasive.'

. . . More importantly, a growing body of empirical evidence

demonstrates consistent and disturbing patterns of 'significant' noncompliance by
firms with environmental statutes and regulations.").
12. David Barkin, The Social and Environmental Impacts of the Corporate
Responsibility Movement in Mexico Since NAFTA, 30 N.C.J. Int'l. L. & Com. Reg.
895, 906 (2005).
13. Babcock, Responsible Environmental Behavior, supra note 5, at 953
(discussing how the cost of replacing traditional light bulbs with compact
fluorescent light bulbs has inhibited individuals from making the change even
though there would be a significant environmental benefit if they did).
14. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 121-22
(describing the health effects of individual sources of pollution, many of which are
also released by industrial and manufacturing facilities); see also ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 6,
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The environmental problems created by unregulated or
inadequately regulated sources of pollution are exacerbated by the
Environmental Protection Agency's ineffective enforcement.' 5
Indeed, some facility managers attribute their compliance more to the
threat of a lawsuit by environmentalists than out of fear of federal
enforcement.16 A commonly given reason why EPA's enforcement
program is broken is lack of resources; 7 another is the sheer quantity
of regulated activities the agency must monitor, which overwhelms
Changes in enforcement priorities to
its enforcement capacity.

Fig. 1.2 (6th ed. 2009) (displaying United States Environmental Protection Agency
Unfinished Business Report's list of remaining environmental problems).
15. One indication of the ineffectiveness of federal enforcement is calls to give
the government additional enforcement tools. See, e.g., Noel Wise, Personal
Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending the Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine to Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement Cases, 21 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 283 (2002) (suggesting extension of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine to civil enforcement matters to improve deterrence, and, if necessary,
amending certain environmental statutes to achieve that result).
16. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 314 (quoting an environmental
manager at an American pulp and paper mill, and saying, "[tjhe EPA is such a
monolith, it can't adapt. It takes a decade to get something to happen. The
environmental community is really setting the tone. It's done far more to make
companies accountable for pollution. It does more to keep me on my toes, to give
me an incentive to go to my management and say, we have got to do better because
the community can sue us and also give us the biggest rewards"). However, the
U.S. Supreme Court has erected many barriers that environmentalist plaintiffs must
surmount before they can persuade a court to hear the merits of their claims. See
Hope M. Babcock, The Problem with ParticularizedInjury: The Disjuncture
Between Broad-BasedEnvironmentalHarm and Standing Jurisprudence,25 J. L.&
ENVTL. LIT. 1, 8-11 (2010).
17. Case, supra note 11, at 81 ("Resource limitations may be the most
Congress has
significant problem hindering effective enforcement efforts.
historically provided inadequate and unrealistic budgets to meet the overwhelming
statutory mandates for environmental regulators."). One possible indication of this
is the recent announcement by EPA that it is planning "to set fewer national
enforcement priorities than in past years" so that it can concentrate its resources on
individual industries of specific concern. Andrew Childers, Fewer Enforcement
PrioritiesEnvisioned by EPA for 2011, 2012, 2013, Official Says, Env't Rep., 41
ER 282 (Feb. 5, 2010).
18. Case, supra note 11, at 83 ("Despite the many enforcement success stories
reported by the government, the number of violations overwhelm the enforcement
capacity of both the federal and state governments." (quoting David R. Hodas,
Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three
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reflect the agendas of different Administrations and agency capture,19
as well as the increasing influence of politics on enforcement
budgetS20 also contribute to the ineffectiveness of EPA's monitoring
of permitted activities and enforcement. Even when the agency
enforces against a corporation, that action can create an unintended
backlash,2 ' lessening the agency's desire to be tough.2 2
Less often examined is how the nature, structure, and priorities of
corporations have made it difficult for government agencies to
control their actions, making enforcement a slender reed on which to
depend to improve the ambient environment. The sheer size and
often multinational character of modern corporations, and the range

Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is Shared by the United States, the
States, and Their Citizens, 54 MD L. REv. 1552, 1558-60 (1995))).
19. Irma S. Russell, A Common Tragedy: The Breach ofPromises to Benefit the
Public Commons and the Enforceability Problem, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 557,
569 (2005). Russell also notes the asymmetries of Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the
Commons in that the burden of enforcing a public right falls unevenly on the
individual who brings the enforcement action and the public - the individual
enforcer bears 100 percent of the cost and only a fraction of the public benefit. Id.
at 566.
20. Case, supra note 11, at 82 ("The politicization of enforcement budgets also
has a negative impact on compliance monitoring and enforcement. Even when not
a result of partisan politics, historically insufficient budget allocations for
enforcement on both federal and state levels often decrease further in the face of
lean economic times.").
21. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of
Social Norms in CorporateEnvironmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55,
84-85 (2003) ("enforcement actions against well-intentioned business managers
can affect compliance by contributing to a 'culture of resistance' in the regulated
community . . . that rather than increasing compliance, aggressive enforcement

often contributes to a perception of regulatory unreasonableness, which reduces the
managers' commitment to law compliance and undermines general norms of social
responsibility"); see also Christine Parker, The "Compliance" Trap: The Moral
Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement, 40 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 591, 61213 (2006) (discussing the efforts of big business to derail the agency's enforcement
efforts by "backroom political lobbying", which "can result in legislative and
administrative reform, media attention, and public critique .. . [as well as failure to
reappoint people or promote particular staff member]).
22. See Tom Tyler & John Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking
Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy ofLegal Authorities into Account
When FormulatingSubstantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 707, 712 (2002) ("Some
research supports the suggestion that variations in the perceived certainty and
severity of punishment do shape people's compliance with the law.").
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of activities in which they engage make it difficult to apply a single
jurisdiction's laws to them and of having any certainty of producing
an overarching effect on that company's business activities or
behavior.2 3 For many large firms, penalties are merely a cost of
doing business, particularly if the penalty does not recapture for the
public the benefits that inured to the company from violating the
law. 24 Victor Flatt and others make the point that traditional penalties
actually work only to the extent they affect individual corporate
officers and plant managers.2 5 But, it is extremely difficult to make
23. See Victor B. Flatt, Act Locally, Affect Globally: How Changing Social
Norms to Influence the PrivateSector Shows a Path to Using Local Government to
Control Environmental Harms, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 455, 461 (2008) ("It
has long been assumed that such behemoths [i.e., multinational companies] do not
necessarily submit to the legal and policy choices of any one jurisdiction. Thus, in
a globalized economy, which has global environmental and other concerns, we
would have to find some way to get the private sector to engage in environmental
protection without the force of traditional nation-state law.").
24. Id. at 465 ("Economists can apply a cost-benefit analysis to this situation to
determine whether it makes sense to break the law. As such, enforcement penalties
that do not capture the benefit of the violation to the violator may be considered
ineffective and problematic."); see also Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming
Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 733 , at 745 (1998) ("Fines are
expressively ambiguous punishments because they make it look like an offender
can buy his way out of punishment, and most of us don't think criminal acts should
be subject to market logic."); Dan M. Kahan, Shaming White Collar Offenders, 12
FED. SENT. R. 51, 1999WL 1458623, *8 (Vera Inst. Just.) ("The public values
punishments not just as cost-effective means of regulation, but as authoritative
statements of shared values. Imprisonment unambiguously and potently expresses
the community's moral condemnation; fines and community service on the other
hand, often do not."); Daniel M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White Collar
Criminals:A Proposalfor Reform of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. &
ECON. 365, 380-81 (1999) ("The problem with fines is less the perception that they
are ineffective deterrents than the perception that they are ineffective symbols of
disapprobation. The public expects criminal punishments not just to protect them
from harm but also to express moral disapproval of the offender's conduct.
Imprisonment does this unambiguously because of the sacred place of liberty in our
culture. Fines do not, because they are open to the interpretation that society is
attaching a price tag to, rather than prohibiting, the punished behavior - we cannot
condemn someone morally for buying what we are willing to sell, even if we are
charging a high price for it."); id at 381 n.39 ("If the offense was committed in the
course of commercial activities, then a fine is likely to be derided as merely the
'cost of doing business.').
25. Flatt, supra note 23, at 466 ("Traditional penalties ... only work because of
their effects on individual behavior. It is a person who goes to prison, not a
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an enforcement case against an individual for violating environmental
laws, even without a requirement for mens rea, which is why it is
easier to proceed against the company under strict liability laws like
the Clean Water Act. 2 6
The ineffectiveness of government enforcement and the underinclusiveness and leniency of current regulatory programs has left the
federal government "dependent on voluntary compliance behavior by
corporate environmental actors" to achieve regulatory goals,2 7 and
for such reason some academics have endorsed the need for
alternative and innovative approaches to changing corporate
behavior.28 Moreover, EPA's enforcement against a business may
not do much to change that business' attitude toward its
environmental behavior, if it considers its behavior to be
economically or morally justified. 29 The next part of the article
describes the nature of corporations and corporate culture against

corporation. Moreover, it is people who are hurt by the loss of money and income,
not a disembodied legal entity. Though we think of civil and punitive penalties as
deterrent-based or hard enforcement, they depend no less on human reaction to
incentives than do social norms."). But see Drew Feeley, Personality,Environment,
and the Causes of White Collar Crime, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 201, 206 (2006)
("Although white-collar crimes, like traditional crimes, leave a string of victims
and devastation, studies reveal that the public, and even corporate criminals,
overlook or underestimate the wrong in the crimes committed. Until recently, lax
governmental regulation and weak penalties allowed corporate crime to grow and
sent a message that the government did not consider these crimes important
problems."). See generally Wise, supra note 15, 291 (arguing for application of the
corporate responsibility doctrine to civil infractions of environmental laws).
26. Wise, supra note 15, at 320 (saying that the Clean Air Act's civil provisions
hold violators strictly liable and explaining that the House committee's decision not
to include a mens rea component because that would lessen the deterrent effect of
the law's enforcement provisions made the law a public welfare statute enforceable
under the responsible corporate officer doctrine).
27. Case, supra note 11, at 83.
28. Id. ("Innovative, alternative approaches for inducing change in corporate
environmental behavior are also necessary because the existing regulatory system
'remains vastly under-inclusive, both in the types of harm it regulates and in the
sources of harm it regulates," and citing as examples "global climate change, nonpoint source water pollution, risks related to manufacture and use of toxic
chemicals, and wasteful consumption natural resources and energy supplies.").
29. Parker, supra note 21, at 592 ("Simple deterrence will often fail to produce
compliance commitment because it does not directly address business perceptions
of the morality of regulated behavior - it merely puts a price on noncompliance.").
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which the effectiveness of these approaches towards reforming
corporate culture can be evaluated.
II. THE NATURE OF CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATE CULTURE
THAT MAKE THEM INDIFFERENT TO BEING A
ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN

GOOD

A. The Nature of Corporationsand CorporateCulture

Corporations are very powerful. Indeed: [n]o institution
other than the state so dominates our public discourse and
our private lives ...

[they] make almost everything we

consume. Their advertising and products fill almost every
waking moment of our lives. They give us jobs, and
sometimes a sense of identity. They define communities,
and enhance both our popular and serious culture. They
present the investment opportunities that send our children
to college, and provide for our old age. They fund our
research.3 0
The sheer size and power of the larger, multinational firms has made
it difficult for governmental agencies to control their actions.3 1
And their public image is not good-today, a not uncommon view
They
of corporations is that they "pollute our environment.
the
virtues
of
messages
never-ending
with
the
impoverish our spirits
of consumerism. They provide a living, but often not a meaning.
And sometimes they destroy us; our retirement expectations are
underfunded, our investments hopes are dashed, our communities are
left impoverished." 3 2 This part of the article looks more closely at
corporations and tries to identify those features of corporate structure
and culture that tilt them in the direction of being poor environmental
citizens. These characteristics lead some to think that the only way to
30. Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reform" and the New
Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 640 (2000-01) (quoting
Laurence E. Mitchell, Preface to PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, at xiii (Laurence

E. Mitchell ed. 1995)).
31. Testy says that corporations "rival the state, and certainly the church in
institutional power and influence." Testy, supra note 2, at 1228.
32. Branson, supra note 30, at 640-41 (quoting Laurence E. Mitchell, Preface to
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, at xiii (Laurence E. Mitchell ed. 1995)).
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improve a business' environmental performance record is to change
its basic organizational structure and culture. 33 The question is
whether corporations can be trusted to do this or is outside persuasion

necessary? 34
The dominant purpose of corporations is to maximize shareholder
wealth.3 5 Although "the shareholder primacy norm is embodied
neither in past or present legal standards nor in corporate practice," it
continues to hold sway. 36 "The corporation is structured to produce
foods and services efficiently and to maximize the return on
investment to the shareholders"; the "corporate form" does not allow
it to "internalize social responsibilities," that should be left to the
political system.3 7 The shareholder model makes it unlikely that a
corporate culture, which devalues expenditures that are not focused
on increasing shareholder wealth, will change any time soon.3 8
Shareholders "are largely passive investors," and the fact that "share
ownership is widely dispersed" makes it difficult for them "to
overcome collective action and free rider impediments to effective
corporate suffrage." 3 9 This means one cannot rely on shareholders to
33. Case, supra note 11, at 101 ("Many argue that significant and long-term
improvement in a firm's environmental performance requires changes in
organizational structures and corporate culture.").
34. See, e.g., April Dembosky, Protecting Companies that Mix Profitability,
Values,
NPR,
Mar.
9,
2010,
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=124468487
(identifying
efforts underway in California and Vermont to modify their corporate laws to
include a social responsibility purpose).
35. Ruth 0. Kuras, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canada- U.S.
Comparative Analysis, 28 MAN. L.J. 303, 303 (2002) ("[The] single purpose [of
corporations] is shareholder wealth maximization"); see also Branson, supra note
30, at 612 ("the sole objective of corporate managers was to increase profits for
shareholders"). Testy refers to this as "the hegemony of the shareholder primacy
model." Testy, supra note 2, at 1230.
36. Testy, supranote 2, at 1231.
37. Hall, supra note 6, at 798 (quoting Ira Millstein).
38. See William W. Bratton, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment,
(Draft Paper, Jan. 26, 2010) (on file with author), for an extensive critique of the
shareholder model and recent reforms to empower shareholders.
39. Testy, supra note 2, at 1230-31; see also Branson, supra note 30, at 606
("collective action problems[, including] the simple difficulty of shareholders
knowing who else owns shares in a particular company, the costs of
communicating with them, . . . and costs posed by regulatory compliance,"

"prevent[ed] shareholders from coming together to assert, or reassert themselves" if
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control environmentally harmful corporate actions, let alone raise a
banner of corporate social responsibility. 40
The pressure to maximize shareholder wealth restrains a
company's eagerness to comply with government regulations, let
alone go beyond compliance. 4 ' In most circumstances, corporate
decision makers will be "more concerned about the economic
consequences of a social demand than its health or environmental
benefits, especially where such benefits are contested"42 or uncertain,
as environmental benefits often are. Neil Gunningham, and his coauthors, suggest that these constraints, what he calls a company's
"economic license," "will serve[] as a brake on very costly 'beyond
compliance' environmental initiatives, particularly those that could
not be justified in margin-of-error or win-win terms." 43 The interplay
they "thought the corporation was headed in the wrong direction, or its assets were
being mismanaged"); id ("the free rider problem,

. .

. [consisting

of the non-

activist reformer shareholders who] are willing to 'free ride' on the efforts of their
pro-active brethren. Too many free riders will doom any collective effort").
40. See Branson, supra note 30, at 631-32 (saying while institutional activism
[by shareholders] has certainly increased . .. there is . . . no doubt that the promise

of institutional investor activism, was the oversold idea of the early 1990s"); see
also Leora Falk, Investors File 95 Resolutions Seeking Action on Climate Change
Issues, 41 ER 546 (Mar. 12, 2010); Voting Your Shares May Start to Matter,
N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 6, 2010, at 1 (discussing ways that small shareholders can
exercise greater power and quoting an associate director of a shareholder advocacy
group on environmental issues as saying "[t]here have been many successes
shareholders have had in changing corporate policies and practices"). But see BP
Shareholders Want to Re-Evaluate Canadian Oils Sands Project, CLIMATEWIRE
(Feb. 9, 2010), (discussing a recent resolution filed by a coalition of BP
shareholders asking the company to re-evaluate its $10 billion investment in a
Canadian oil sands project prior to the company's annual meeting because of
concerns about the increased costs and harm "to the company's reputation because
of the project's environmental damage")
41. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 332 ("economic concerns often
constrain the degree of beyond-compliance behavior firms are willing or able to
undertake").
42. Id. at 334 ("where the economic costs of social demands are high, and the
health and environmental benefits are small, uncertain, or contested, legal and
political actors are likely to be less responsive to social pressures"); see also,
Babcock, Assuming PersonalResponsibility, supra note 5, at 127 (discussing how
cognitive dissonance affects people's understanding of the harm pollution may
cause); Babcock, Responsible Environmental Behavior, supra note 5, at 954-56
(describing the confusion over mercury exposure from CFLs).
43. Gunningham et al., supranote 10, at 335.
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"between a firm's economic license and the demands of social
stakeholders helps determine how far a firm will go beyond legal

compliance."44
Another economic constraint on corporations behaving better is
what Gunningham says is the lack of interest by what he refers to as
"the enforcers of economic license - investors, lenders, and financial
analysts"-in having companies "invest in very costly environmental
measures or technologies that do not improve productivity and profits
unless government regulations assure that the firm's competitors will
be compelled to make similar expenditures."4 5 The same is true of
the producer of "greener products" who "will not benefit if its only
competitors can easily replicate the same innovation." 46
The final economic factor weakening the pressure on corporations
to change their behavior are the business' customers. Although most
Americans like to think of themselves as good environmentalists,
their environmental behavior is often poor; nowhere is that poor
behavior more apparent than when they function as consumers.4 7
This lack of concern has a direct effect on corporate behavior. As
Gunningham notes in his study of paper mills "[a]s long as customers
continued to care more about cost, brightness, and strength of their
paper than about the pulp mills' chlorinated organic numbers, most
mills used regulatory requirements as their chief guide to
environmental performance" and showed no interest in doing more. 4 8
This indifference enabled companies to treat their "economic license
constraints as fairly fixed," with the result that "[t]hey did not strive
44. Id. at 336; see also id at 334-35 ("when the harm is associated with ...
only [the] production process and not the product produced, social license demands
are less effectively enforced through economic mechanisms" like boycotts).
Gunningham interchangeably refers to a company's social licensees, social actors,
and social stakeholders, who together constitute a company's social license, and
who place "demands on and expectations for a business enterprise that emerge from
neighborhoods, environmental groups, community members, and other elements of
the surrounding civil society." Id. at 308.
45. Id. at 335.
46. Id. at 336.
47. See Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 122-23
(discussing personal consumption patterns of individuals).
48. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 335. See generally Babcock,
Responsible Environmental Behavior, supra note 5, at 953-56 (discussing the
obstacles to good environmental behavior caused by a products architecture, cost,
and inconvenience).
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to generate more customer demand for unbleached or less bright
paper in order to reduce the environmental impact of unrecycled
bleaching chemicals in their effluent.'A 9 In other words, unless a
firm's customers demanded a change in product, the firm was not
going to educate its customers to make that demand.so Preservation
of "reputational capital"5 1 is only of concern to companies that
produce goods and services for direct public consumption, and even
that concern is confined to protecting the company's market share.52
The open hostility of some corporations to environmental
regulations reflects "a pervasive distrust of regulatory solutions to
economic problems, together with a concomitant faith in the
righteousness of private ordering." 53 Financial capital is given a
"privileged status" in corporate governance, which the "obsessive
focus by corporate managers and investment communities on shortterm share price" reinforces. 54 But "[c]orporate governance of
organizational environmental behavior has been largely inadequate to
American
attain desired levels of environmental protection.
protection
environmental
promote
to
corporate law generally fails
goals and is, at best, 'environmental-neutral.'" 5 5 Marc Stanley relates
49. Gunningham et al., supranote 10, at 335.
50. But see id. at 320 (enforcing social license demands can be realized
Customers can impose direct economic costs on
"through the market:
noncompliant firms through boycotts, and firms that build a reputation for
outstanding environmental performance sometimes can gain price premiums or
enhance their position in the labor market"). At the same time, Gunningham
admits that boycotts only work if the company is concerned about its reputation or
the reputation of its products. Id. at 334 (boycotts "may be impossible to organize
or less effective against companies that are less concerned about their reputation,
either because they do not have a consumer market or branded identity to protect,
or because the harm is not associated with a product directly, but rather with a byproduct of the production process").
51. Id. at 320 (explaining how reputational capital works).
52. Id. at 319 ("good environmental citizenship (and avoiding a reputation for
bad environmental citizenship) will in the short or long run be 'good business"').
53. Testy, supra note 2, at 1228.
54. Testy adds to that list the "exponential growth in the transfer of technology
and other products across national borders." Id.
55. Case, supra note 11, at 79. Even when modem corporations do good, their
motives are suspect, for example, while Hall notes that businesses in the early
1950s worked to relax the barrier to corporate giving, the reason they did that was
to increase their political influence and "to maintain the free enterprise system though such self-interested concerns were generally cloaked in philanthropic
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the story of British Petroleum's horrific refinery accident at its Texas
City plant that killed fifteen workers as an example of a company that
balanced the risk of harm occurring against known costs the company
would incur if proactive steps were taken to avoid the harm's
occurrence. 5 6 He describes how the company "[r]einvented and
rebranded [itself] as the model of an expanding and caring modem
corporation committed to environmentalism and quality,"57 at the
same time as "BP executives had ordered the company to 'bank the
savings' realized from refusing to upgrade machinery and safety
equipment.ss
B. The Ineffectiveness ofApologies, Norms, and Shame as
Motivators of Changed CorporateBehavior
American corporations seem to be largely impervious to many of
the sanctions that work in other cultures. So, for example, apologies
by the heads of companies, like those recently made by the chief
executive officer of Toyota for various mechanical problems, are

rhetoric which stressed ties between philanthropy and profitability." Hall, supra
note 6, at 816.
56. Marc R. Stanley, When Bad Companies Happen to Good People, 56 DRAKE
L. REv. 517, 522 (2007-2008).
57. Id.
58. Id.; see also id. (at the time of the 2005 accident, "BP had led the industry in
the number of refinery deaths from 1995 to 2005, and over that entire decade, there
was a fire a well at the Texas City plant"). The self-branding trend continues today
in the form of a barrage of BP newspaper ads that immediately followed the
massive oil spill resulting from the blowout and destruction of the company's
deepwater drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico. See Todd Wasserman, Brandweek, BP
Print Ad Addresses Gulf Oil Spill, ADWEEK, June 2, 2010, available at
http://www.adweek.com/aw/content display/news/strategy/e3i4811 cd742d860d93
ba32caa0bl3dcf2c ("As the Obama administration opens civil and criminal
investigations into the huge oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the party responsible for
the spill, BP, has rolled out advertising addressing the crisis," the tag line of which
is "We will get this done. We will make this right."). The ads have engendered
wide public criticism, including from President Obama who reportedly said that
"the money should be spent on cleanup efforts and on compensating fishermen and
small business owners who have lost their jobs because of the spill." Jennifer Kay,
Associated Press, Apologetic BP Advertisements Draw Criticism - Not Sympathy,
ABILENE

REPORTER-NEWS,

June

6,

2010,

available

http://www.reporternews.com/news/2010/jun/06/apologetic-bp-ads-get-criticismnot-sympathy/.

at
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rarely uttered by American CEOs.59 When they are, the words of an
apology "are so carefully parsed, scrubbed by lawyers or picked over
by public relations professions that it is unclear just how much mea is
in their culpa." 60 One obvious reason for the reluctance of American
captains of industry to apologize is the "worry that apologies may be
red meat for shareholder lawsuits." 6 1 The sheer size of the egos of
CEOs of large companies also makes it difficult for them to admit
mistakes-"[y]ou don't get to the top of a large and highly
competitive organization by debasement and humility." 62 One sign
of this is how many of the so-called "lightning rods" of the financial
59. Andrew Martin & Michael Maynard, For Bankers, Saying 'Sorry' Has Its
Perils, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 2010, at Al (reporting on research conducted by a
management professor at Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth that showed
"heads of Fortune 500 companies almost never apologize for poor performance."
In fact he found only one such company out of "100 or so companies" that
"acknowledged managerial culpability"); id (noting that "[t]he politics of humble
[in the US] is seen in stark contrast in Japan, where executives often make
wrenching public apologies for their missteps"); see also id. (quoting a
management professor from Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania as
saying on the one hand "American culture does not put a premium on apology," but
on the other noting that "[t]he level of anger in this public in general is extremely
high against those who led Wall Street into the abyss, in part because they never
stepped forward to apologize for the mess they made"). But see Ken Belson,
Toyota's Wrecked Image Needs the Right Bodywork, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010
(The World), at 3 (discussing the recent recall of cars by Toyota, and saying that to
reclaim its prior market position Toyota "has "started taking some of the necessary
steps, including apologizing for its mistakes ... but that mea culpas do not come
naturally at Toyota").
60. Martin & Maynard, supra note 59; see also Garvey, supra note 24, at 792
("An apology must be the consequence of punishment and the only good apology is
a sincere apology."); id. (discussing "apology rituals" and saying that "[g]enuine
apologies . . . can have an almost a magical character . . . [and are] a form of self-

punishment that cuts deeply because we are obliged to retell, relive, and seek
forgiveness for sorrowful events that have rendered our claims to membership in a
moral community suspect or defeasible").
61. Martin & Maynard, supra note 59. One exception to this is the recent
apology of the former head of Time Warner, Jerry Levin, in which he took blame
for "the worst deal of the century," described as "stunning in an environment that
generally frowns on apologies as a sign of weakness." Id.
62. Id. (quoting, Robert F. Bruner, Dean of the Darden School of Business at
the University of Virginia); see also id. (reporting that General Motors executives
"expressed no regrets" for the billions of dollars lost as a result of the company's
misguided investment in Fiat, and instead have compared the losses to "water over
the dam").
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crisis have simply "stayed out of the limelight, aside from
appearances at Congressional hearings;" while others have offered
only "tepid apologies," like being "sad" about the state of their
companies and admit to making only "some" unidentified mistakes.63
Although social norms, including the compliance with law norm,
can play an influential role in decisions that individuals make about
their behavior,64 their influence on corporate behavior is much more
problematic. 65 This may be because the underlying behavior that
violates a social norm is not perceived by corporate officers as being
wrong.66 Victor Flatt makes the unsurprising point that the structure
of corporations "wreaks havoc with the power of norms, as individual
power must be squared with corporate incentives." 67 Another
impediment to the influence of norms on corporate behavior may be
the problem of competing norms-the norms favoring individualism
and competition versus the more communal norms of cooperation
and law compliance.6 8 Yet another factor that dulls the persuasive
6 3. Id.
64. See generally Babcock, Assuming PersonalResponsibility, supra note 5, at
134-42 (discussing the role of social norms in influencing individual environmental
behavior). But cf Babcock, Responsible Environmental Behavior, supra note 5, at
953-56 (discussing the limits placed on that good behavior by a products design,
cost, and the inconvenience of buying it).
65. See Amir Licht, Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples Obey the Law, 4
Rev. Law & Econ. 715 (2008), for an interesting discussion of social norms and
their role in influencing behavior at both the individual and societal level.
66. Kahan & Posner, supra note 24, at 379 ("The embezzlement of funds, the
discharge of toxic wastes, violation of the Housing Code, and fraudulent steer
swapping may not have seemed to be particularly immoral acts to the people who
engaged in them, nor to the people in their immediate circles. They may have
rationalized these actions as relatively harmless or (in the second and third cases) as
reasonable responses to burdensome regulations.").
67. Flatt, supra note 23, at 464. But see id. at 455-56 (attributing the willingness
of corporations to take "steps to help the environment outside the traditional
regulatory system" to "changing social norms in their various incarnations: public
demand, advertising, shame"). Indeed, harkening back to the good old days in
which corporations believed that they had an important role in enhancing certain
communal values, Flatt suggests that "good, old-fashioned engagement and
community building can bridge the norm gap from a leader to the community that
needs to change." Id at 473.
68. See Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 152
("within an individual there may be conflicting norms competing for control of that
individual's behavior"); see also Flatt, supra note 23, at 464 (citing Professor
Renee Jones for the proposition that "social norms alone seem unable to curb
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power of norms is the pressure to make money. 69 The ability of
widely held social norms to influence corporations depends on the
public's understanding of the environmental harm caused by the
corporation's activities, which can be problematic because of the
complexity of environmental harms and their often less than
*
immediate
impact. 70
One factor that can influence the behavior of businesses that
produce items for public consumption or offer services to the public,
Flatt says, is the company's reputation; 7 sometimes the personal
reputations of their officers and managers may also be important.7 2
However, if there is not "a reputation market," there will be no
incentive for companies to comply with environmental regulations,
let alone go beyond compliance. 73 At the same time, Flatt candidly
admits that "the importance of corporate reputation is related to

corporate behavior, primarily because of the complexity of competing norms and
responsibility").
69. Flatt, supra note 23, at 464-65 (citing Rena Steinzor as saying "moral
suasion as it affects individual people seems not to work as well in the corporate
environment, most likely because of the enormous pressure for short-term profits").
70. See Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 168
(saying that environmental information underlying how people perceive risks "is
contentious, complex, contestable, and frequently from non-credible sources"); see
also Flatt,supra note 23, at 467 ("social norms of the general public only positively
affect corporate action to the extent the public really understands the complexity of
the corporate action"); Andris Takdcs-Sdntra, Barriers to Environmental Concern,
14 HuM. ECOLOGY REV. 26, 33 (2007) (explaining that environmental problems
that individuals have no experienced personally are viewed by them as more remote
and less serious than those they have experienced) (2007).
71. Flatt, supra note 23, at 468 (saying sometimes it makes more sense to focus
on personal reputation, because "[e]very person has a community and this
community exerts power").
72. Id. ("Can a multinational corporation feel shame and peer pressure? The
answer to that is obviously 'no,' but the people who run and make the decisions for
these corporations can"); id at 466 (identifying as a possible "vehicle" for "altering
incentives related to social norms" either individual or corporate reputation).
73. Id. at 467 ("Depending on the private sector to alter its behavior to
accommodate changing public desires does not work for everything. In some cases
there may not be a reputation market, in which case there would be no monetary
incentive for environmental compliance." (citing as examples companies that "do
not sell a product, or whose products are otherwise regulated")). Flatt sees a direct
link between the importance of corporate reputation and certification standards and
advertising, which he claims has been increasing. Id at 466.
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money - for instance, being perceived as green may increase market
share." 74
Shame may also be an uncertain motivator of corporate behavior 75
76
is
However, some scholars, like Jayne
as it is for individuals.
Barnard, believe that "[h]igh status business leaders may be
especially susceptible to shaming rituals" because as a group they are
the individuals "most likely to worry about public appearances, to be
vulnerable to moralistic or judgmental social groups, to defer to
authority and to be relatively conventional in attitudes toward 'law
and order."' 77 "They are also the people most likely to be concerned
about maintaining the appearance of business competence and
Barnard refers to this as a
professional accomplishment." 78
79
However, there are so many
"'reputational rub-off effect."
74. Id.
75. But see Kahan & Posner, supra note 24, at 385-86 (recommending that
"individual white-collar defendants . . . be subject to a special hybrid penalty

consisting of a fixed shaming component and a variable fine component. The
shaming component, which would be the same for all defendants, would consist of
stigmatizing publicity in the form of a media announcement, paid for by the
defendant, detailing in a straightforward fashion 'the nature of the offense
committed, the fact of conviction, the nature of the punishment imposed, and the
steps that will be taken to prevent the recurrence of similar offense."').
76. See Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 161-65
(discussing problems with shaming individuals).
77. Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S.
CAL. L. REv. 959, 968 (1999); see also id at 969 (discussing the power of what she
calls "woodshed proceedings," where corporate CEOs are publicly taken to the
woodshed in front of a judge, and how doing this to individuals "who typically
think of themselves as beyond public criticism and censure" can have a powerful
impact).
78. See id at 968; see also Parker, supra note 21, at 610-11 ("[I]n order for a
business to comply with the law, it must be confronted with the fact that the reality
of its own behavior does not match its ideological posture of compliance. Simple
deterrence via economic penalties on its own generally will not provoke an
adequate conflict about the businessperson' or firm's identity because penalties can
be readily reconciled with a purely commercial rationality.").
79. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Shaming Revisited: An Essay for Bill
Klein, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 105, 110 (2005) (noting that Stephen Cutler, former
director of enforcement at the SEC, made a speech in which he suggested "that the
[offending] companies themselves should engage in internal shaming," and in his
speech, which he gave throughout the country, "he named names, holding up
wayward executives and companies to informal condemnation"); see also Barnard,
supra note 77, at 969.
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problems with using shame as a motivator of good behavior that there
is no reason to believe that those problems could be overcome,
especially when shame is applied to a corporation or its leadership,
given at least the leadership's capacity to tell a counter story.
The BP story told earlier illustrates the harm that a company can
cause when it is indifferent to the need to be environmentally
responsible. This harm "makes it unacceptable simply to wait and fix
things after the fact. Thus, there is a need to channel business
activity constructively and to identify and address problems before
they become catastrophic." 80
But, the size and power of
corporations, the dominant ethos of shareholder wealth
maximization, and the ineffectiveness of social pressure, norms and
other common motivators of behavior that affect them, make any
change in corporate behavior a challenge. It remains to be seen if the
CSR movement, which arose in response to social pressure and runs
counter to the wealth maximization ethos, can truly change corporate
behavior. It is time to turn to that movement.
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY MOVEMENT AND SOME INDICATIONS OF ITS
DURABILITY

The concept of corporate social responsibility probably has as
many different definitions as it has initiatives gathered under its
rubric.
For example, Ruth Kuras defines corporate social
responsibility as corporations "spending corporate funds, at the
discretion of corporate management, on doing 'good works' for the
community or as refraining from doing 'bad works."' 82 She also says
that it has been described "as denoting the 'obligations and
inclinations, if any, of corporations organized for profit, voluntarily
to pursue social goals that conflict with their presumptive shareholder
desire to maximize profit."' 83 For purposes of this article, the
80. Jay G. Martin, Implementing Effective Corporate Legal Compliance
Programs, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T., Spring 1997, at 14, 14.

81. See Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 325 ("environmental management
style - the attitudes and modes of thought that guide corporate and mill-level
policy, not social pressure alone - is a key variable in determining the capacity of
social pressures to shape corporate environmental performance").
82. Kuras, supranote 35, at 303-04.
83. Id. at 304.
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concept is limited to initiatives that corporations undertake to
improve their regulatory compliance or go beyond what regulations
require either to reduce emissions below mandated levels or limit
their activities in areas that are not currently regulated. Examples of
this latter category might be regulating nonpoint source pollution,
reducing energy or water consumption, or reducing the amount of
waste material the business produces.
The concept of corporate social responsibility is not new; however,
an actual movement promoting it is. In the mid to late 19th century,
there was a "traditional ethos of corporate citizenship"; what is
surprising is how quickly it disappeared. 84 According to Peter
Dobkin Hall, in an article on the changing patterns in corporate
charitable giving, the traditional role of business leaders before the
Depression was to be involved in "changing and improving American
living standards." 85 Business leaders recognized that "economic
growth depended on a variety of non-economic 'quality of life'
factors: the availability and cost of housing, a skilled and contented
workforce, up-to-date public utilities, recreation, and freedom from
political corruption., 86 Businesses "fostered the growth of civil
society and the accumulation of social capital, working through
chambers of commerce, trade associations, service clubs, organized
charities, and local institutions of higher education." 87 During this
period, it was not "good business for corporations 'to take substantial
benefits from their membership in the economic community while
avoiding the normally accepted obligations of citizenship in the
social community. ,,8
Douglas Branson finds "the beginnings" of the modern corporate
social responsibility movement in various initiatives that arose in the
middle of the last century, like "the 'good governance' movement;
the stakeholder versus stockholder debate; renewed calls for
84. Hall, supra note 6, at 794 (referring to "[tihe wholesale abandonment of the
traditional ethos of corporate citizenship").
85. Id. at 812.
86. Id.; see also Licht, supra note 65, at 735 ("[business'] proclivity towards
entrepreneurship is negatively related to cultural harmony." This is consistent with
harmony's "de-emphasis on venturing, assertive action, and risk taking" (citations
omitted)).
87. Hall, supra note 6, at 812.
88. Id. at 795 (quoting testimony by various corporate leaders in A.P. Smith
Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 583 (N.J. 1953)).
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corporate social accounting and disclosure; the 'green' movement in
manufacture and advertisement of products; advocacy of
communitarian models of the corporation and of 'progressive'
corporate law; and a newly strengthened environmental
movement." 89 The overall movement's:
[T]hesis was that, in order to solve the ills of society
thought in large part to be the product of corporate behavior
(in turn thought to be the result of the separation of
ownership from control), some sort of government
intervention was necessary to make large corporations and
their managers again accountable, if not to the owners of
such corporations, then to the society as a whole. 90
The environmental part of the modern CSR movement "[r]oughly
coincide[ed] with Earth Day, in April, 1970."91 One subset of the
environmental wing of the CSR movement is the so-called "green
movement," 92 with its "green advertising," 93 "green product
manufacture and competition, and green management." 9 4
89. Branson, supra note 30, at 605-06; see also id at 605 ("One subset of
proposed reforms" arose in the 1970s, and consisted of reformers urging
"governmental intervention which, as a matter of general corporate law, would
expand corporate responsibility from primarily shareholders, to workers,
consumers, suppliers, communities in which the corporation had a significant
presence, clean air, clean water, and other constituencies."); id at 641 (explaining
that the role of the "large activist institutional investors" changed in the 1990s
when they "placed corporate social responsibility on their agendas" "[i]n selecting
and then monitoring their investments").
90. Id. at 611; see also id. ("Corporations were so large, and their behavior
affected so many in society, that the law should regard them as public, or quasipublic, institutions and regulate them as such.").
91. Id.
92. Id. at 646 ("The green movement forms a principal part of the new
corporate social responsibility movement.").
93. Id. at 645-46 (saying the least effective of these is green advertising because
it's claims are often "misleading"). Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission's
recently announced that it is updating its environmental marketing guidelines
(Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims or Green Guides) "[i]n
response to the explosion of green marketing," reflecting some concern about the
accuracy of environmental assertions companies are making about their products.
Gabriel Nelson, FTC Moves May Signal Start of 'Greenwashing' Crackdown,
GREENwIRE,
Feb.
3,
2010,
(Bus.),
at
1,
available
at
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However, this first iteration of the modern CSR movement's affect
on corporate behavior and culture did not last. One reason for this is
that in the late 1960s, when businesses reacted to growing public
agitation about race, poverty, and the environment by allowing social
concerns to influence managerial and marketing choices, these
decisions, which were not proactive, "often lacked any demonstrable
connection to productivity, profitability, or the other core purposes of
business firms."9 5 Then, in the 1970s, when "political liberalism"
lost favor, "the weakly reasoned rationale for corporate social
responsibility became ever harder to defend." 96 Another reason is
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/02/03/4. Although section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the FTC to take action against
companies that "are misrepresenting their practices to clients," the agency has only
infrequently initiated such actions against fraudulent environmental claims in the
past, but the hope is that the issuance of stricter Green Guidelines may "signal an
intention to step up enforcement." Id at 2; see also Branson, supra note 30, at 645
(commenting on the "duplicity of consumers who claim that "they consider a
product's environmental reputation in purchasing decisions," while much fewer of
them "select more expensive products because of the products' environmental
benefits"); id (saying consumers may also be "environmentally 'penny wise and
pound foolish,' using recycled paper and composting coffee grounds, while driving
a Ford Expedition or some other environmentally unfriendly SUV"). Although
perhaps not "duplicitous," the Edison Electric Institute opined with respect to
carbon offsets or renewable energy credits that most consumers buy them "as a
feel-good sort of thing." Nelson, supra,at 3.
94. Branson, supra note 30, at 644-45; see also id. at 646 ("Green product
introductions and green product competition [as forming] a bridge between green
advertising and green management.").
95. Hall, supra note 6, at 816; see also Branson, supra note 30, at 638
("Uniformly in the 1970s, corporate executives' response to corporate social
responsibility advocates was a Calvin Coolidge's retort that 'the business of
business is business."'); id. at 639 ("Ten years later, when their [managers'] high
price jobs were potentially at stake in the takeover wars, U.S. corporate managers
sang a different tune. In defending against takeover bids, they pompously intoned
that they had a grave responsibility to consider all of the stakeholder interests
bundled together in the large modem corporation."); id at 639 ("Stakeholder
advocacy wasn't the first, nor will it be the last, time in which corporate America
has been hypocritical but this particular hypocrisy stands out for its clarity").
Branson blames the law and economics movement with its emphasis on "an
efficient allocation of investor and managerial resources" for swiftly eclipsing the
earlier corporate social responsibility movement. Id. at 605 ("Seldom in the annals
of jurisprudence has one jurisprudence ascended so quickly, while the one it
supplanted simultaneously faded into oblivion.").
96. Hall, supra note 6, at 816.
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that the initiatives stepped away from corporate law as the governing
mechanism in favor of outside regulation by the government." 97
However, Branson notes that the movement's:
[E]mphasis on 'good corporate governance' [encompassing
the idea of a majority of independent directors, "intense
scrutiny of governance in large corporations," a view of
"governance "as a matter of structure and focus or
mission"] . . . will occupy center stage for some years to

come. It forms one of the principal props of the 'new'
corporate social responsibility movement. 9 8
What makes the CSR movement different, and perhaps of greater
durability, this time is that it has a "more muted, less shrill, and
therefore more sustainable, tone." 99 Another reason the movement
may last is because it is:
[C]onverging with, rather than diverging from, broader
trends in corporate governance. The 'good governance'
and stakeholder versus shareholder movements are not
apart from but may be viewed as yet another element of the
new corporate social responsibility movement. Looking
through the lens the other way, the new corporate social
responsibility movement is but an element of good
corporate governance.1oo
For example, traditional corporations see calls for "corporate social
accounting and SEC mandated disclosure of annual corporate social
results," "as less intrusive proposals" than proposals for weighted
voting and public interest directors, which came out of the earlier
97. Branson, supra note 30, at 630.
98. Id. at 626, 630; see also id at 618 (saying that "at the same time some of the
more ardent corporate reformers rejected proposals like federal minimum corporate
standards because they "merely reinforced existing notions of responsibilities of
corporations and their managers to shareholders." These "reformers wanted to
create as a matter of general corporate law, and not merely discrete federal laws on
various subjects, direct corporate responsibility to workers, consumers,
communities, regions, and clean air and water").
99. Id. at 647.
100. Id.
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reform movement.1 'o And for those who always believed that
"managerial powers were held in trust for the entire community, and
not just for shareholders," it is public opinion that has finally changed
to the extent that it is more accepting of the fact that a corporation is
'"an economic institution02which has a social service as well as a
profit-making function.",1
Yet some scholars describe the CSR movement as "the most
aggressive, and arguably progressive, of the ... counter-accounts of
shareholder
primacy
and
relentless
short-term
wealth
maximization." 103 As proof of this they point toward the "broader
net" various theories of corporate social responsibility cast, which
emphasizes "'all of the social costs of corporate activity, and
therefore embrace, for example, environmental or political concerns
as well as stakeholder interests."' 04 One "subgroup of participants in
101. Id. at 613; see also id. at 614 (describing another acceptable "social
accounting proposal[]," "super audits," [where] "a corporation would attempt to
quantify every adverse impact the corporation had on environments in which the
corporation operated, along with corporate efforts to ameliorate them"); id at 644
(attributing the success of "calls for corporate ... accounting" to the fact that they
"are more muted and thus more sustainable than cries for more drastic, intrusive
social responsibility reforms such as federal chartering or mandatory public interest
directors. They are at the core of the new corporate social responsibility
movement").
102. Kuras, supra note 35, at 305 ("[P]ublic opinion, which ultimately makes law
... is today making substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business
corporation as an economic institution which has a social service as well as a
profit-making function. . . ." (quoting E.M. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate

Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145, 1148 (1932))). But see id. at 303
(questioning whether the structure of U.S. corporate law contains "a legal
obligation for a corporation to be 'socially responsible' by acting in the best
interests of shareholders").
103. Testy, supra note 2, at 1238. But see Kuras, supra note 35, at 319 ("In the
United States, the traditional corporate law standard of shareholder wealth
maximization continues to be the governing principle . . . . Individual state

constituency statues, enacted as a response to hostile takeovers in the 1980's, are an
explicit recognition of non-shareholder interests by state legislatures. However
they have failed to create a mandatory obligation to consider stakeholder interests
in corporate law.").
104. Testy, supra note 2, at 1238 (quoting David Millon, New Game Plan or
Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law,
88 VA. L. REv. 1001, 1002 n.5 (2000)). But see id at 1236-37 (criticizing "the
stakeholder theory," which says corporate managers should consider all "the
"related, but separable interests in the manner in which a corporation exercises its
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the progressive corporate law movement"' 0 5 are communitarians,
who "believe that corporations have a duty to stakeholders in addition
to

duties

mandated

to

shareholders . . .

[who]

view

social

responsibility as encompassing many areas including general
charitable giving, contributions toward the community and the
environment, behaviour toward employees and suppliers, and
behaviour toward consumers." 06
This new duty, what Gunningham refers to as a "social license," 0 7
consists of "the demands on and expectations for a business
enterprise that emerge from neighborhoods, environmental groups,
community members, and other elements of the surrounding civil
society."tos His study of paper mills1 09 confirmed the role of a
power" because it "risks creating a free-for-all among stakeholders in the quest for
control of the corporate enterprise, a free-for-all in which the already powerful are
likely to continue to prevail," and also noting that "the ambiguity in defining who is
and who is not a 'stakeholder' will actually increase the power and discretion of
management, because they will be beholden to no one in particular" (citations
omitted)).
105. Branson, supra note 30, at 639 (referring to these reformers, and saying that
they "advocate a 'communitarian' model of the corporation, which 'focuses on the
sociological and moral phenomenon of the corporation as community, in contrast to
the individualistic, self-reliant' group of purely economic actors").
106. Kuras, supra note 35, at 306.
107. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 308 (discussing a company's "'social
license"' which constrains it "to meet the expectations of society and avoid
activities that societies (or influential elements within them) deem unacceptable,"
and defining it "as the demands on and expectations for a business enterprise that
emerge from neighborhoods, environmental groups, community members, and
other elements of the surrounding civil society").
108. Id.; see also id. at 309 (referring to a firm's customers, shareholders,
neighbors, and environmental groups as empowered "institutions of civil society").
The authors explain how the unique interplay between a company's "legal license"
(i.e., its operating permit) and its social license can lead to tighter regulatory
restrictions if the company ignores the demands of its social licensees and
regulators and political actors are activated. Id. at 331; see also id at 322 ("In
addition to increasing the vigilance with which existing rules are enforced, the
demands of social actors can also tighten legal requirements."); id. at 330 (saying,
other laws, such as those that "grant citizens standing to sue either a company or a
regulatory agency, expand access to information, require companies to consult with
local communities, or invite advocacy groups to participate in the regulatory or
legal decision-making process," are other examples of how the terms of the legal
license expand the social license).
109. See generally Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 328.
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company's social licensello in the company's beyond compliance
behavior.''' Sometimes companies are so sensitive "to the messages
they send to local communities 1 2 that they are willing to compromise
substantially on the terms of their legal license and permit
conditions." 1 l 3 The "interactions among the regulatory, economic,
110. Id. (explaining that this social license gives "corporate officials an
additional incentive to comply or even overcomply with the terms of their
regulatory license, for legal compliance often serve[s] as an important benchmark
of company cooperativeness or commitment in the minds of social license
enforcers"). Disclosure laws can also empower local activists to demand a higher
level of compliance by industries in their communities; see id. at 330 ("Laws
requiring firm-wide disclosure of environmental information, can also empower
local communities, albeit indirectly," citing TRI as an example of "the potential
power of informational regulation."); see also id (quoting a Canadian pulp mill
manager as saying that a Canadian environmental scorecard that outlined
"environmental performance indicators and major infringements of regulations,
was . . . 'a pretty effective tool. . . . It keeps you in compliance because public
pressure is more demanding than the regulatory agencies . . . . [A]gencies are more

forgiving"').
111. Id. at 330 ("[C]ompliance with regulation often will not in itself satisfy
broader community concerns, which often extend well beyond the standards
embodied in regulation or facility permits.").
112. Id. at 331; see also id. at 319 (saying the new desire of corporations "to be a
good neighbor" and "agree to engage in some behavior not legally required" comes
from the realization that it is "local stakeholders that give [corporations] the right to
operate").
113. Id. at 331; But see id. at 320 ("social license demands, if not met, can be
translated into new legal requirements" - i.e. "result in a tightening of the
regulatory license"); id. at 329 (explaining how "the legal license can also be
expanded as a result of interaction with the social license - for example, as social
pressure on legislators feed through in terms of enactment, monitoring and
enforcement of regulation"); id at 329 (explaining that direct empowerment
includes legislation that enables local communities "to participate in
decisionmaking" about some industry's future plans, e.g. public notice/comment,
hearings. Such legislation "created an environment in which mills had a strong
incentive to listen and respond to community concerns; if they failed to do so they
risked delays, possibly for years, in obtaining the consents they needed to introduce
technological and other changes."). Gunningham also found that "the way
enforcement agencies exercise their discretion may be influenced substantially by
community mores and expectations." Id. at 331. What Gunningham refers to as the
"regulatory license," a company's permit or authorization to operate, can extend
"the reach and impact of the social license, either directly empowering social
licensors, or by giving them access to information, which they can then use to
pressure target enterprises." Id. at 329.
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and social strands of the [company's] license to operate often
intensify the overall constraints under which companies operate. In
other cases, however, tensions between the economic, social, and
regulatory forces may pull firms in different directions.""14 For
example, the economic license which can direct businesses to reduce
or even eliminate environmental expenditures may be in direct
conflict with the social license which would like to see the company
increase those expenditures." 5
The traditional view of corporate environmental behavior was that:
[C]orporations complied with law only for instrumental
reasons (to avoid legal penalties) or because, 'regulations
are taken to be a measure of societal expectations, and thus
interpreted as a guide to an organization's moral and social
duties.' From this traditional point of view, corporations
could be expected to take actions that went 'beyond
compliance' only where they saw some financial selfinterest in doing so, such as increasing profit, usually over
the short term."1 16
There are some indications that this view may be changing, in part
as a result of a generational "shift in power from the post-war
generation to the baby boom and post-baby boom generations,"
which has brought into the work place young managers and workers
with a depth of knowledge about environmental issues that the prior
generations did not have, who want to be "part of an admirable
organization," and who are themselves agents for change within the
company." 7 A new willingness to go beyond compliance even when

114. Id. at 329.
115. Id. ("The economic license . . . often calls for limits on or even reductions in
environmental expenditures, while the terms of the social license push for an
increase.").
116. Id. at 308 (citations omitted); see Stephanie Rosenbloom, Wal-Mart Plans
to Make its Supply Chain Greener, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2010, at B3, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/26/business/energy-environment/26walmart.html
(reporting criticism of Wal-Mart's recent announcement that it could cut
approximately 20 million metric tons of greenhouse gas emissions from its supply
chain because "rather than change its business model" it was pressuring its
"suppliers to change theirs").
117. Bernard, supra note 1, at 310-11.
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it may not be profitable may also be due to the infusion into these
companies of "an amorphous group of middle and senior managers,
engineers, and scientists" whose goals are 'no longer confined to
profit maximization," but are more aligned with social goals, and
with their company serving some social purpose, "the growing
sophistication and coalition-building skills of the social investment
community" as well as the increasing "sophistication and political
savvy of environmental activist groups,"" 8 changes in the investment
markets,1 9 such as "independent and credible benchmarking
programs such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index" and "growing
support among venture capitalists and hedge funds for 'clean energy'
and related technologies that make being 'green' look sexy, new, and
above all, alluring for investors," 120 and the growing realization that
"any hazards and harms that their enterprise engenders, even if not
clearly illegal today, will sooner or later be subject to public censure,

118. An example of the effectiveness of environmental activists at pressuring
companies to stop engaging in environmentally destructive actives even when laws
do not require that they do so, is the decision by Unilever to drop PT Smart, a
supplier of palm oil, after the company's violations were brought to the attention of
Unilever by Greenpeace. See Unilever Drops Palm Oil Supplier Over Rain Forest
Destruction,
CLIMATEWIRE,
Feb.
24,
2010,
available
at
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/print/2010/02/24/8. The company dropped a
second palm oil supplier after the BBC filmed its employees clearing a protected
rain forest for palm plantations. Id
119. See Joel Kirkland, Business: Road Map to SustainabilityRests on Corporate
Governance, CLIMATEWIRE, Mar.
11,
2010, at 2,
available at
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/print/10210/03/11/3 (reporting that the CEO of
California's Public Employees' Retirement System's $200 billion asset portfolio
"considers environmental issues a core part of the equation when it comes to
corporate performance").
120. Barnard, supra note 1, at 301; id (listing as yet more factors leading to this
change in attitude "the increasing role of 'cover'-providing alliances that facilitate
environmental reforms without requiring a company to be the first mover; . . .
increasing support for environmental best practices by mainstream investors; ...
globalization; . . . rising oil prices; . . . climate change;"); see also id at 306

(alliances are valuable because "(1) they provide a mechanism for promoting
change that does not require a participant to step forward as a first-mover or to act
alone; (2) they provide credibility by publishing data, offering informed
interpretation, and awarding prizes for selected performers; and (3) they provide a
forum for the exchange of information and mutual reinforcement").
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government action, and legal liability."1 2 1 These internal and
external changes may mean that the new corporate environmental
responsibility movement has more fertile ground in which to grow.
Barnard believes that the corporate social responsibility movement
will endure this time because she finds evidence of "the emergence of
a new language of social responsibility - and uniform disclosure
practices - that business leaders can embrace" (e.g. change from
global warming to climate change), and the emergence of highprofile corporate officers as spokespeople for environmental CSR
programs. 122 She finds instances where corporate boards have
redefined "their long-term objectives to take into account the
possibility of increased government regulation" as well as their
recognition of "the increasing risk of a costly response to changing
environmental conditions . . . and growing consumer preferences for
products sold by companies that are good corporate citizens." 1 23 This

121. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 308. Going beyond compliance in
these circumstances can sometimes take the form of companies building a "margin
of safety" into their activities. Id. at 310.
122. Barnard, supra note 1, at 301; see also id at 302 (making the poipt that
phrases such as "'corporate social responsibility"' and 'corporate social
accounting"' "has passed through boardrooms without stopping, as boards insisted
on cutting costs, off-shoring production, and managing earnings - all to the end of
maximizing shareholder value"). Barnard notes that "[h]aving a common language
and format achieves three objectives: (1) greater transparency; (2) consistency over
time; and (3) comparability across industries and firms." Id. at 302-03; see also
Branson, supra note 30, at 640 ('[N]ew' corporate social responsibility, or
progressive corporate law, movement promises to grow and occupy center stage in
the coming decade."); Testy, supra note 2, at 1238 (saying with respect to the
stakeholder theory of CSR that it "has made its way into business school
classrooms," where "future managers are taught that it is good for the corporation
to consider all stakeholders and that such inclusiveness is part of a corporation's
best practices. Accordingly, taken at the level of discourse, the stakeholder (or
'communitarian') approach to corporate governance has had substantial effect and
promises to continue to thrive, at least in this norm-creation and norm-modification
sense").
123. Barnard, supra note 1, at 291; see also id at 302 (saying boardrooms are
finding much more appealing "the triple bottom line" concept which embodies "a
balance between shareholders values and stakeholder values"); Kirkland, supra
note 119, at 1 (quoting a recent report by Ceres on initiatives by various companies
to adopt sustainable practices, as saying "'corporate scandals and the current
economic crisis have heightened demands for new approaches to governance,
particularly in relation to executive compensation and risk management. . . . As
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change in concerns has percolated down to corporate managers who
are:
[N]ow anticipating and shaping ways to (1) minimize
regulatory encroachment on their activities; (2) profit from
the changing regulatory regime; (3) reduce their exposure
to climate change effects; (4) sell products that can profit
from climate change and its consequences; and (5) attract
customers for whom environmental impact ("green-ness")
is a salient feature of purchase decisions. 124
Assuming arguendo that Barnard and Branson are right that the
corporate social responsibility movement will be around for some
time then it is important to learn who actually benefits from it corporations or society as a whole. It is to this task that the article
next turns. Of special interest in the following discussion is whether
the benefits that corporations receive are strong enough to motivate
businesses who have implemented CSR initiatives to redesign them
without external compulsion to make them more effective.
IV. BENEFITS PERCEIVED AND OTHERWISE FROM VOLUNTARY
ENVIRONMENTAL

CSR PROGRAMS

There are clear benefits to companies as well as to society in
general when businesses not only comply with regulatory
requirements, but go beyond compliance.
However, society's
benefits depend in large part on whether CSR programs will actually
meet their proclaimed goals. But, before looking more closely at that
question, this part of the article attempts to identify what those
benefits are, as it may be much harder to realize benefits to society at

sustainability has risen up the corporate, investor and public policy agendas, it has
become more fully integrated into these governance expectations."').
124. Barnard, supra note 1, at 291; see also Sara Standish, Business and Climate
Change: Examining Driversfor Action, 5 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 9, 11
(2005) (commenting that "employees of companies who have jumped the
regulatory gun to achieve a higher level of emission control will already be trained
to manage the new more stringent emission controls when they come into effect,
which will make compliance with the new regulations easier." They will also have
the hands-on experience "to adapt more easily to future regulations").
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large through CSR initiatives than to achieve businesses' goals,
which are more direct and immediate.
A. PotentialSocial Benefits from Properly ConstructedCSR
Initiatives
It makes sense to think that CSR programs will fundamentally
change corporate environmental behavior because they call for
increased awareness of environmental actions, which should, in turn,
influence organizational decision-making on matters affecting the
company's environmental performance.1 25 Greater attention to a
company's environmental performance might improve its compliance
record,126 which would be a social good, as would any movement by
the company to achieve a higher threshold of compliance than
regulations demand or fill some regulatory gap. "The effort to
encourage organizations to achieve environmental performance that
exceeds the minimum requirements of environmental law [s] .. . is in

125. Case, supranote 11, at 109 ("[T]he realignment of organizational structures
and culture in order to focus more specifically on environmental concerns will
result in behavioral change through increased awareness of environmental impacts.
This enhanced knowledge base will potentially lead to more effective
organizational decision-making regarding environmental performance and
outcomes."); see also Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 339 ("[C]orporate
environmental behavior cannot be explained purely in terms of instrumental and
moral obligations to comply with the law. On the contrary, in an increasing range
of circumstances, at least in reputation-sensitive industries, corporations
contemplate going beyond compliance for reasons more closely connected with the
perceived terms of their social license, even if the extent to which they do so may
be constrained by economic considerations."). Even Testy, although deeply
skeptical about CSR programs, admits that they appear to fall closest to his "goal of
transforming corporations, "and by "changing the relationship between
corporations and society," they "might further progressive causes." Testy, supra
note 2, at 1243, 1246.
126. Barkin explains that the recent movement in Mexico by the government "in
"the direction of market directed incentives" and "rewarding self-compliance" "can
only be understood in light of the systematic private sector efforts to gain
credibility and build capacity for corporate self-regulation, both as an acceptable
method for compliance with environmental norms and as an alternative to
government regulation." Additionally, he notes that business "leaders are carefully
negotiating a new relationship with the public sectors [one that] deliberately
avoid[s] conflicts between the public sector mandate of establishing a normative
framework for regulation and the private sector's objective of assuming
responsibility for compliance." Barkin, supra note 12 at 905.
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significant part an indirect means of addressing the underinclusiveness problem of the existing regulatory regime." 2 7
Reducing reliance on EPA's broken enforcement program would also
be a good thing.
The public benefits from CSR initiatives that might make
industry's production processes "greener" or motivate companies to
produce "greener" products.128 For example, General Electric's
"Ecomagination" Program promises to improve "efficiency by 30
percent by 2012" and reports that its sales of eco-friendly products,
like solar energy, will double by 2010 with improved company
profitability.129 Goldman Sachs has adopted "environmentallyfriendly policies in deciding where to deploy its financing expertise"
and AIG' has created an office focused only on addressing insurance
risk created by climate change.130
Additionally, information
generated through green management programs, like environmental
management systems,131 "has the potential to change corporate
behavior by 'providing feedback directly to' managers on ways "to
reduce environmental impacts and risks"1 32 and help a company's
stakeholders (its consumers, investors, local communities, and
environmental activists) bring "post-disclosure public and marketbased pressures" on companies to change their behavior.133
But engaging in green management practices holds out particular
challenges for companies because "developing greener products and
processes requires innovative, creative efforts by companies, as well
as consistent, sustained financial and other support throughout the

127. Case, supranote 11, at 83-84.
128. "Green management also holds out some hope of changing corporate
behavior because it can include the appointment of directors and facility managers
with specific environmental responsibilities and encourage corporate policies that
promote "sustainable use of natural resources, reduction and disposal of waste,
[and] wise uses of energy." Branson, supra note 30, at 646.
129. Barnard, supranote 1, at 297.
130. Id. at 300.
131. See discussion infra Part V.C. (discussing EMSs).
132. Case, supranote 11, at 103.
133. Id.; see also id. at 104 ("Considerable policy benefits can occur if such
information is disseminated to third parties, such as workers, consumers,
shareholders, regulators and the general public.").
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decisionmaking levels of the organizations."l34 Product or process
redesign "requires sustained creative effort, sustained financial
commitment, and a willingness to confront the substantial business
risks that are presented by the processes. These requirements must
have support within the facility, but they also require top
management support at the national level."l 35 Gunningham's paper
mills study "offer[s] substantial conceptual support for the idea that
green products and green processes grow out of deeply imbedded
characteristics of a particular managerial culture and that adopting an
EMS [green management], while useful, is by itself not likely to lead

to such changes."l 36
There are other concerns that may undercut the perceived public
benefits from environmental CSR programs. Since most companies
adopt environmental CSR initiatives to improve their bottom line,' 3 7
this raises the serious "concern that corporate social responsibility
will become just another commodity that businesses sell in the
service of short-term shareholder wealth maximization; rather than
the basis for any substantive change in the way business is done."' 3 8
Even Branson, who is agnostic on the issue of who benefits from the
CSR movement, observes that while "the debate" over whether:
[C]orporations

[should]

be

recognized

as

'public

institutions with public responsibilities' . . .. has ebbed and
flowed since the 1930s . . . . [t]he difference today is that

134. Kurt A. Strasser, Do Voluntary CorporateEfforts Improve Environmental
Performance?: The Empirical Literature, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 533, 543
(2008).
135. Id. at 544.
136. Id. at 545.
137. Testy, supra note 2, at 1239 (complaining that "most commitments to [the]
idea [of social responsibility] are increasingly cast in terms of improving profits
rather than improving the societal conditions that first spurred the progressive
corporate law movement"); see also Flatt, supra note 23, at 477 (noting that when
Houston's mayor suggested that the "city begin purchasing large amounts of wind
power .

.

. [he] gave as a public reason that it was cheaper and more reliable, i.e.,

better for business, while secondarily touting its benefits to the environment").
138. Testy, supra note 2, at 1239; see also id (noting business's "enormous
capacity for commodification"). Testy also questions whether corporate managers
who are neither "elected officials" nor "a particularly diverse. . . group," and who
"under the current structure of corporate law ... enjoy virtually unchecked power
and discretion" will actually change anything. Id.
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many corporate managements [who] have wrapped
themselves in the banner of corporate social and public
responsibility ... have done so ... with a mixed or hidden
agenda. 139
B. Possible Benefits to Businessesfrom CSR Programs
The prior discussion of societal benefits from the implementation
of CSR programs raises at least the possibility that, while potentially
meaningful, their realization may be less than complete in all
instances. There is no question, however, about the large benefits
that corporations receive from the environmental CSR movement, as
this next part of the article shows.
For companies concerned about their reputations, adoption and
implementation of CSR initiatives can pay big dividends. A
company's "reputation capital"1 40 can help reduce "the risk of
adverse social campaigns" 1 41 and blunt their impact on the
company's sales, its share price, and access to investment capital.142
A company's stakeholders can deplete its "reputation capital,"
through "criticism or expand [it] with praise." 4 3 Communities and
environmental groups often use a company's compliance record to
judge its "compliance with the broader social license leading
companies to fear enforcement not because of the penalties they may

139. Branson, supranote 30, at 635-36; see also Katherine E. Kenny, Note, Code
or Contract: Whether Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct Creates a Contractual
ObligationBetween Wal-Mart and the Employees of its Foreign Suppliers, 27 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 453, 457 (2007) ("codes of conduct arose either as a direct
result of private campaigns or in anticipation of such campaigns," and that
"[c]ompanies saw codes of conduct as a means to gamer public favor by appearing
as if they were cleaning up their acts").
140. Gunningham et al., supranote 10, at 319.
141. Id. at 326; id at 320-21 (reporting that one paper mill environmental
manager said that "building reputation capital is a good economic investment"
because they were most concerned about informal sanctions imposed on the
company by the public and the press, and "avoiding 'anything that could give you a
bad name').
142. See id. at 323; see also id ("[b]ad publicity generated by carefully staged
media events .. . can impact directly on corporate image and sales and indirectly on
share prices and access to investment capital").
143. Id. at 319.
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receive but because of the attendant adverse publicity. 144 A good
reputation can also "lubricate[s] the regulatory process," by giving
those companies entr6e to political actors and regulators, sometimes
enabling them to win regulatory flexibility, thereby earning a distinct
competitive advantage.145
CSR initiatives, like those that encourage voluntary disclosure of
information about their greenhouse gas releases, may create
competitive or other advantages for the disclosing company, as those
businesses may be seen "as early adopters" and thus "curry[ing]
investor favor in international markets as the global awareness of
industry's role in climate change deepens."1 46 Some "investors
perceive strong environmental performance as an indicator of
superior business management, resulting in a premium on the stock
price and a lower cost for capital"; these companies earn "higher
stock ratings from 'socially responsible investment ('SRI') analysts,
resulting in more stock purchases by SRI investors." 4 7 Companies
that change their product processes or their products can get a jump
on anticipated regulations, gaining an advantage over their

144. See id at 330 (saying that the fact that communities and environmental
groups "use compliance (or noncompliance) with regulations to judge a company's
compliance with the broader social license .

. . . [leads]

some companies [to] fear

enforcement not so much because of any penalty the regulator is likely to inflict but
rather because enforcement actions generate adverse publicity and, as a
consequence, informal sanctions imposed by the public, the media, and perhaps
also by markets").
145. See id. at 326 ("Building reputational capital also gives companies far
greater control over their destiny. . .. [Leading] a number of companies to develop
proactive strategies for dealing with communities, ENGOs [environmental
nongovernmental organizations], and governments.").
146. Leslie Kaufman, Industries Disclose Emissions to Claim the High Ground,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 2009, at Bl; see also id (reporting that some investment
analysts "now laud the program [CDP] as an innovative way of encouraging
investors to factor industry emissions into assessments of corporate performance").
147. Standish, supra note 124, at 11. But see Branson, supra note 30, at 635
(describing the role of institutional investors and saying that "[i]nstitutional
investor activism has certainly increased. Today there is no doubt that activism, or
the threat thereof, is a factor in the good governance movement, and from time to
time, in the forced removal of a CEO by a board of directors. There is also not
doubt, however, that the promise of institutional investor activism was the oversold
idea of the early 1990s .

. .

. [I]nstitutional investor activism never has been and

never will be the panacea that legal and other academics made it out to be").
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competitors who have not yet done so.148 This can create a market
advantage for these companies, as "some investors are now using
environmental proactivity as a proxy for outstanding management of
other issues."l4
Companies who adopt CSR initiatives to improve their
performance beyond what regulations require may find favor with
environmentally conscious consumers by creating an environmentally
friendly corporate brand, thus helping "the companies' bottom
lines."150 Taking additional steps to reduce emissions that "entail
expenditures which are not justified in terms of traditional,
quantitative analyses for assessing likely profitability," can enhance
"the firm's reputation for good environmental citizenship," which is
be good for business.1st Firms can use the affect of "[s]trong
environmental performance" to recruit and retain employees and even
The affect of being
encourage higher productivity. 152

148. Barnard, supra note 1, at 308; see also Flatt, supra note 23, at 467 (noting
that some companies who have changed their positions or processes to reduce
climate change have done so "because of the likelihood of regulation"); Sara
Standish, supra note 121, at 11.
149. Barnard, supra note 1, at 308 ("[C]orporations are coming to understand
that '[a] company that is really good at managing its environmental footprint or
taking proactive steps to keep pollution of out landfills or out of airsheds or
watersheds is going to be better positioned almost no matter what for any new
environmental legislation that comes down the pike."'); see also Stanley, supra
note 56, at 528 (addressing global investment patterns in response to corporate
corruption and quoting the former head of an investment organization as saying
"[e]thical conduct attracts capital, and capital allows for wealth-producing
investment. In the global economy, capital is mobile and risk is priced. As
investors perceive more risk of being cheated, they will charge more for others to
use their capital and likely offer less of it. Therefore, investors have good reason to
seek out countries with less corruption."). The same might be said of the response
to environmental irresponsible behavior and the risks it creates.
150. Flatt, supra note 23, at 467 ("Even changes in anticipation of regulation
may be seen as a way of preemptively appealing to the marketplace in advance of
being forced to act."); see also Standish, supra note 121, at 11 (saying one reason
companies create greenhouse gas strategies is to create a public perception of "the
corporate brand as environmentally friendly, leading to improved public
relations").
151. Gunningham et al., supranote 10, at 319.
152. Standish, supra note 124, at 11; see also Gunningham et al., supra note 10,
at 320, n.17 (noting the importance of personal relationships, such as a "plant
managers' feelings of personal pride or pressure from friends concerning their
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environmentally responsible before being required to be so
additionally "gives the company greater credibility with government
regulators and thus a greater voice in policy discussions and an
opportunity to influence policy outcomes," such as the set point of
any new regulations.1 53 Firms who go beyond extant regulatory
requirements may well see their permit applications fast-tracked and
may avoid future challenges to plant expansions as well as other
disruptions caused by environmentalists and the local community.' 54
Indeed, Gunningham's paper mills study reveals that "mills
sometimes use compliance with the social license to gain respite from
the terms of the regulatory license," citing one mill manager as
saying "'[i]f you can sell something to the local community, they will
stand in front of the regulators on your side.'" 5 5
For these reasons, expenditures supporting over-compliance cannot
"be viewed as economically irrational"; indeed, in certain
circumstances firms would be unwise not to undertake them.1 56 But,
how many companies will be willing to assume the substantial costs
and business risks these CSR activities create, e.g. the "steep learning
curve" the company must undertake when it takes early action to
regulate an activity that is at present unregulated or under-regulated,
as well as "capital costs and potential penalties" for being a "first
mover[s],"'5 especially when there is uncertainty about what the
agency will actually do?
The perception that businesses gain more from the environmental
CSR movement than the public becomes stronger when specific CSR
programs, and their design flaws, are examined, as the next part of
the article proposes to do.

plants' environmental performance" as a motivator of responsible firm
environmental behavior).
153. Standish, supra note 124, at 11.
154. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 321; see also id at 323 (pointing out
that environmental groups "seek to influence customer preferences, sensitizing
them to the environmental consequences of the products they buy and urging and
orchestrating consumer boycotts").
155. See id at 331.
156. Id. at 321 (noting that this is the obverse of what "an economic rationalist
might argue [namely] that firms which overcomply cannot continue to operate in a
competitive industry (since firms that comply exactly would underprice them) ...
in certain circumstances, they cannot afford to do otherwise").
157. Standish, supra note 124, at 10.
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CSR ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES

Information disclosure, voluntary performance standards, and
environmental (or green) management systems (EMSs) are three
widely adopted environmental CSR programs. The explicit goal of
each is to change corporate behavior so that not only businesses that
implement them improve their regulatory compliance records, but
also are more willing to go beyond compliance and achieve a higher
level of ambient environmental quality than required by law. This
part of the article describes the design features of each of these
initiatives as well as their flaws in order to determine in the next part
of the article how those flaws might be corrected to increase the
likelihood that they might achieve their self-proclaimed goals.
A. Voluntary Information Disclosure
The idea behind corporate social transparency is corporate
accountability about the "social, political, and environmental"
impacts of a company's activities. 5 8 This information can help nongovernmental organizations and political activists inform the
regulatory process, and can "create the political conditions necessary
to enact" additional regulations. 159 Consumers and investors benefit
from greater disclosure of a company's environmental performance
as it gives them better information on which to base their
purchasingl 60 and investment choices,' 61 and has wider "financial

158. Cynthia Williams, Text of Remarks on Panel: "Codes of Conduct and
Transparency," 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 415, 416 (2000-2001); see

also id. ("The concept of corporate social transparency is based on the idea that
investors and members of society should have consistent, high quality, accurate
information available about the social, political and environmental effects of
corporate action both here and around the world."). Williams believes so strongly
in the value of public disclosure of corporate environmental behavior that she
argues for mandatory disclosure. Id. at 415. Her principal thesis is that there should
be greater "corporate social transparency in the capital markets comparable to the
financial transparency that now exists, and that the means to achieve corporate
social transparency is to require public reporting companies to disclose more
information about the social, political, environmental and human rights
implications of their actions" and she argues that this can be done through federal
security laws. Id.
159. Id. at 419.
160. Id.
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implications" for the company.162 Facility managers, who know that
information on their erformance is publicly available, may improve
their performance.'
Information enables companies and their
stakeholders to communicate about appropriate norms of corporate
environmental behavior, helping executives and managers integrate
social and environmental goals into their business plans, thus
potentially transforming their business' culture.' 64 And disclosure of
information allows for external comparisons among companies and
across industries about how well these initiatives are performing on a
per company basis, providing incentives to the best performers to do
better and the worst performers to improve.165 Indeed, companies
161. Id. at 418 ("[S]ocial, political and environmental information is material per
se to socially responsible investors" and "socially screened funds and investments
generally are some of the fastest growing sectors of money under management");
see also Barnard, supra note 77, at 298 (reporting that the 2005 Institutional
Investor Summit on Climate risk focused on "the continuing dialog with the SEC
about the need for more environmental disclosures").
162. Williams, supra note 158, at 418-19 (citing as an example California Public
Employees Retirement Fund's (the largest such fund in the country) recent decision
to "screen all of their international investments for the human rights records of the
company in which they were being asked to invest [in]"); see also id. at 419
("expanded social disclosure is necessary to meet the information requirements of
[socially responsible investors], and it is useful to economic investors because of
the financial implications from how companies manage important social
relationships").
163. Id. at 419 (saying there would also be benefits "to the public generally from
requiring this disclosure, given the potential effects on managers from acting with
the knowledge that the results of their actions are going to be made public," and
citing the positive effect of Proposition 65 and the Toxic Release Inventory).
164. Case, supra note 11, at 106 ("Without sufficient information,
communication between the organization and societal stakeholders about
appropriate norms of corporate environmental behavior cannot occur. Absent such
communication, societal environmental goals are not internalized by corporate
actors and thus integrated into corporate decision-making. Ultimately, the primary
objective of reflexive environmental law approaches, the 'transformation of
business culture,' will not take place." (citations omitted)).
165. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 338-39 ("Explicitly comparative
information dramatically increases the social meaning of environmental
information because it identifies both the leaders in an environmental arena and the
laggards. It therefore provides incentives to the best performers to do better, and to
the worst performers to improve because leaders can be rewarded for their
excellence while laggards can be punished."); see also Barnard, supra note 77, at
313 ("competition is often a good motivator for change," citing as an example of
this "the emergence not only of endorsements from social or 'green' investment
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may benefit directly "from engaging in the reflective process
necessary to collect social and environmental information
systematically, evaluate it and make it public."' 66 For example, the
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), which requires its members to post
their carbon emissions on the project's website, provides "a
roadmap" for businesses enabling them to measure their emissions in
comparison with "their peers"; in some cases "persuading companies
to change their energy practices well before many governments step
in to regulate emissions."l 67 If, as Williams says that "'you manage
what you measure,' then requiring companies' social, political and
environmental impacts to be more precisely measured will help them

funds but more recently of media 'sustainability' rankings, [which have] for many
stimulated a desire for inclusion and visibility"). Barnard cites as examples of
"these ranking schemes" "Fortune, which "ranks the Fortune Global 100
companies on measures of corporate responsibility and accountability," and
Business Week, which identifies "a list of top carbon cutters and environmental
leaders," noting that "the lure of 'first' or 'best' remains powerful in the corporate
world." Id. at 314; see also Branson, supra note 30, at 645 (describing how "[t]he
European Union now awards ecolabels (a small flower) to twenty to thirty percent
of a product group based upon the lowest environmental impacts in the group. The
EU staff reviews the award status every three years"). However, the accuracy of
these rankings and comparative schemes depends on the accuracy of the data and
the commonality of their metrics and is confounded by the environmental
challenges and "social forces" that confront each business as well as the responses
to these that each business makes, making comparisons among businesses
impossible. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 310 (discussing the decision to
take a "sector-specific approach" rather than looking at business firms in a variety
of industries in his study of why businesses go beyond compliance).
166. Williams, supra note 158, at 420-21 (citing Ford as an example of a
company that identified "numerous ways both to save money and to reduce their
environmental impact," "to open "up new channels of communications in the
company," and "promote a greater willingness to be self-critical within the
company").
Williams considers expanded corporate social transparency "a
mechanism of social accounting" the goal of which "is to create a format for social
auditing." Id. at 416. One virtue of which, according to Branson, is that at least in
the form of "process audits," they enabled "corporations to decide for themselves
what, beyond profit maximization, was important to them, followed by expenditure
of some corporate resources in the directions identified." Branson, supra note 30, at
614 ("[o]ver time, as employees, managers, and shareholders reacted to annual
social audit results, the mix of corporate social responsibility activities might
change, with some sort of equilibrium being reached").
167. Leslie Kaufman, By Degrees: Coming Clean About Carbon, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 29, 2009, at Bl.
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to be more intelligently managed.... In some cases this will even
enhance profitability."1 6 8
Some, like David Case, believe that "[i]nformation has emerged as
a potential success story in the search for effective and efficient
alternatives to traditional environmental regulatory approaches."' 69
He contends that empirical research, although limited, shows that the
disclosure of information about a company's performance can
improve the performance of regulated firms, in part because the
information can be used "to enlist the aid of social institutions such as
economic markets and public opinion to create incentives for firms to
engage in self-regulatory behavior." 70
Despite the public benefits from companies collecting and publicly
disclosing information about their environmental performance and
the importance of doing this to change corporate culture, 1 7 1 many
companies lack the incentives to gather and then publicly disclose
information that might improve their environmental performance,1 72
as discussed in greater' detail in Part V. Hence the appearance of
CSR information disclosure programs to encourage this happening.
There are several public and private initiatives that encourage, in
some cases require, businesses to report to the public on their
performance. For example, EPA's Project XL and the Environmental
Leadership Program "make corporate reporting to and consultation
with local communities a condition of providing a facility greater
regulatory flexibility."1 73 Examples of private reporting initiatives
include the Business Roundtable's "SEE Change" Initiative.1 74 That
program reports on "some of the resource consumption reductions of
168. Williams, supra note 158, at 421.
169. Case, supranote 11, at 101.
170. Id. at 100; see also id. at 109 (one of "the most significant potential driver[s]
of corporate environmental behavioral change . . . may be the opportunity to link
the substantial information-generating capabilities of formal EMSs [environmental
management systems] with public information disclosure mechanisms"); discussion
infra Part V.C.
171. Case, supra note 11, at 103-04 ("investment in the generation of information
on environmental impacts, risks, and performance alternatives is the 'key' to
internal, management-directed corporate behavioral change").
172. Id. at 103 ("Firms may lack adequate incentives to gather information
necessary to identify opportunities to improve environmental performance.").
173. Gunningharn et al., supranote 10, at 338.
174. Barnard, supra note 76, at 299. SEE "stands for changes in 'social
environmental and economic priorities."" Id.
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major companies like DuPont, as well as Ford and General Motors'
commitment to develop ethanol fueled vehicles, Dell Computer's
commitment to increasing "'product take-back' by fifty percent,"
Sony's green procurement program, and Citigroup's commitment to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions globally by 10% by 2011.175 In
2009, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners adopted
internal rules requiring member companies to report on how global
climate change affects their businesses decisions.176 Under these
rules, starting May 2010, insurers must "publicly disclose climate
risks to regulators and shareholders." 1 77
There are also a variety of voluntary private international reporting
programs, such as, CERES
Report on "Value at Risk" and the
"Global Reporting Initiative," which is a collaborative effort between
CERES and United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) setting
out guidelines for reporting on environmental and other indicators. 179
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is another private voluntary
international reporting program administered by a small London
nonprofit organization whose members disclose their carbon releases
on the project's website.18 0 CDP persuaded major investors like the
California pension program (CALSTRS), the second largest pension
program in the country, and Bank of America Merrill Lynch to cosign letters on the Project's behalf encouraging other companies to
Id. at 300.
176. Joel Kirkland, Risk: SEC to Take Up Climate Disclosure, CLIMATEWIRE,
Jan. 25, 2010, at 1, availableat http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2010/01/25/5/.
177. Id.
178. CERES is a coalition of "primarily American social investors, foundations,
and environmental activists." Barnard, supra note 77, at 292.
179. Id. at 292-301. Ceres just released a new report, Corporate Reporting on
Water Risk: A Benchmark Study of 100 Companies, which was prepared for the
Investor Network on climate Risk. The industry sectors, in which Ceres studied
and evaluated the performance of individual firms, included the beverage,
chemical, electric power, food, home building, mining, oil and gas, and
semiconductor industries. The report concluded that companies should disclose
more information about overall water use and scarcity concerns because of the
enormity of the "growing global challenge" to water supplies from climate change,
and propose strategies for responding to these risks well beyond "the vague
boilerplate language" that appears in annual reports. See Linder Roeder,
Companies Facing Water Scarcity Problems Fail in Disclosing Investor Risk,
Report Says, 41 ELR 384 (Feb. 19, 2010). A full copy of the report can be found at
http://www.ceres.org.
180. Kaufman, supra note 167.
175.
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participate in it.'8 One reason for that program's apparent success
with investors is that it "sends a message that a company that moves
to curb emissions now is girded for the future and therefore worthy of
investment."' 82
Despite the belief of some investors and company executives that
until carbon emissions are regulated, "voluntary reporting programs
like the Carbon Disclosure Project may be the best way to leverage
market forces to change,"' 8 3 there are major flaws with these types of
disclosure initiatives. For example, critics of CDP complain that
there are no requirements to verify emission numbers reported to
CDP through external audits, unlike the audits of financial numbers
disclosed by publicly traded companies, that the program rewards
companies that would have reduced carbon emissions anyway, and
that it has no influence over companies that do not participate.1 84
Even the founder of the CDP acknowledges that the project, while a
"frictionless path toward reining in emissions," "is no substitute for
muscular government regulation." 85 As is true with many programs
that simply require disclosure of information, there are no follow-up
requirements, like a demand, let alone a suggestion that emissions be
reduced, if high levels are revealed, and there are no sanctions for
failing to disclose information under any of these programs or for
reporting inaccurate information.
As one critic complained,
"[t]here's disclosure, and then so what," comparing the project's
request that companies report on their emissions performance to

181. Id.; see also Nathanial Gronewold, Big Companies Push More Suppliers to
Track Emissions, CLIMATEWIRE (Feb. 2, 2010) (saying that CDP reports that "[t]he
number of corporations pushing greenhouse gas emissions reporting and reduction
strategies onto their suppliers is quickly growing and will likely triple in the next
five years").
182. Kaufman, supra note 167; see also id ("'With the regulatory framework
changing, how companies handle carbon is a core risk factor .... Smart companies
will take C.D.P. information and realign their strategies."' (quoting Jack Ehnes)).
183. Kaufman, supra note 146; see also id (reporting that CDP's founder has
"real confidence that the corporations of the word are going to outperform
government in terms of dealing with climate change . . . . In fact, they are

already."); id (reporting on one executive of a major investment company
comparing the CDP "to the advent of general accounting principles, which enabled
investors to compare financial performance and move dollars accordingly").
18 4. Id.
185. Id.
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dipping a "toe in the water ... but not very far."l 86 It appears that the
concept of environmental "corporate social accountability," which
has as its touchstone information disclosure, does not do much. At
most, it imposes only a flawed duty of "enhanced disclosure" on
companies about their environmental performance; even then, it only
"expands the list of items" that large companies must disclose under
federal securities law. 8 7
Even assuming for a moment that a company's reluctance to
publicize its poor environmental record when threatened with
external disclosure may lead it to behave better, this type of behavior
moderating influence depends on managers believing in the
likelihood of enforcement' 8 8 or even that their stakeholders will
sanction them if they are caught, both of which appear unlikely. This
behavioral change, if it occurs, Gunningham says, happens as an
exercise in risk management because "[flacility and company
managers believe that not meeting the requirements of the social
license will ultimately result in increased regulation or greater
economic costs to the company."l89 However, the accuracy of the
company's assessment of risks depends on the accuracy of the data
informing the process, how risks are discounted, and how various

186. Kaufman, supra note 146 (quoting a co-founder of a financial research firm
that gathered information for the CDP); see also id. (reporting some companies
complain that "reporting is cumbersome and could allow competitors to learn too
much about their manufacturing processes").
187. Testy, supra note 2, at 1235 (saying corporate social accountability "avoids
imposing substantive duties on corporations other than one of enhanced disclosure.
Because large public corporations are already under substantial duties of disclosure
under federal securities laws, this does not add a duty as much as it expands the list
of items that are subject to it").
188. See discussion, supraPart II.
189. Id. at 336 (noting, however, although "the extent to which they believe this
and their estimates of costs might vary"); see also id. at 326 (describing a firm's
positive response to social license demands as "risk management, quoting one
senior corporate officer as saying "[w]e became responsible environmental
stewards because it's not in our financial interest to risk operations being closed
down," and another as saying "[a]nything that could give you a bad name is an
unpredictable risk").
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factors are weighted.190 Thus, at any given facility or at any given
point in time the assessment of future risks may change. 19 1
"Only if disclosure convinces investors not to become
shareholders, workers not to become employees, and communities
not to become hosts will it have the requisite effect"'l92 on corporate
behavior. But, information can be an imperfect motivator of
corporate behavior to the extent that it depends on a business'
stakeholders' ability to understand and react to that information in the
form of a social demand. 193 "[S]ocial actors must be able to
determine that a harm has or might well occur and must also have the
organization competence to develop and effectively articulate
demands to address the harm."l 94 Some environmental harms "are
less detectable or harder to trace to particular businesses.

. .

. [E]ven

if those data are available, much depends on the social interpretation
of their meaning."' 95 The public has problems understanding,
190. Id. at 336 (noting that "the extent to which they believe this and their
estimates of costs might vary"); see Babcock, Assuming Responsibility, supra note
5, at 126-27 (discussing how cognitive dissonance plays a role in assessing risk).
191. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 336.
192. See Testy, supra note 2, at 1245-46 (noting in addition that "this theory
depends on a strong presumption that all of those groups have a choice").
193. See id at 1236 (saying for the corporate social "accountability [approach] to
work, the information must make its way to the market in a manner that allows for
its incorporation and dissemination there. Moreover, market participants must be
willing and able to access that information and to act upon it"); see also Richard B.
Stewart, A New Generationof EnvironmentalRegulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 21,
136 (2001) ("Information strategies rely entirely on stakeholders to act on the
information.").
194. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 332; see also id at 325 (noting that the
unpredictability and lack of knowledge about health effects can give "rise to
uncertain public expectations"); Stewart, supra note 193, at 141 ("Even if perfectly
collected and disseminated, [information as a regulatory tool] depends on the
willingness and ability of individuals to properly process the information provided
accurately and act on it. People have limited time, energy, and attention.").
195. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 332; see also Babcock, Assuming
Personal Responsibility, supra note 5, at 166-70 (discussing the problems relying
solely on information to motivate personal behavior); see also Babcock,
Responsible Environmental Behavior, supra note 5, at 957-63 (discussing
ineffectiveness of smart meters to the extent they rely on information to motivate
behavioral change); Stewart, supra note 193, at 141 ("Environmental problems are
inherently complex and are often characterized by significant uncertainties. Yet,
efforts to communicate fully such complexities and uncertainties would produce
information overload, leading people to simply disregard or discount the
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correctly interpreting, and then determining a course of action based
on something that they have read or heard about an environmental
risk.196 Serious cognitive dissonance comes into play when the
information pertains to a future risk, even if the risk is of catastrophic
harm.19 7 The seriousness of the harm, even the question whether it
exists or not, "may also be contested." 198 "[T]he ability to come to an
agreement as to what the harm is and what the appropriate demands
in response to it should be requires a degree of organizational
competence that may be absent in more marginal, disorganized
communities," like low income and some minority communities.1 99
"[O]nce developed, demands must be articulated in a manner that
encourages other social, legal, and economic actors to understand and
respond to them. Incompetent articulation of demands can result in
delegitimation of social demands as extremist or irrational, and poor
communities can be disadvantaged in this regard too." 200 If the
information they receive motivates them to take steps to avoid the
disclosed harms, like boycotting goods produced by a company with
a blemished environmental performance record, unless the aversive
action is costless or only of minimal cost and inconvenience, studies
show that if indeed the public does react, that reaction will be short
lived.2 0 1
There are also a variety of extraneous factors, which can limit the
strength of a company's social license, regardless of what its

communication or distort it through simplification."); Testy, supra note 2, at 1246
("[S]ignificant concerns remain as to whether even required disclosures reach those
groups in a manner in which they can be understood").
196. Stewart, supra note 193, at 141 ("[P]eople use heuristics, including those
based on their prior experiences, to process information and deal with uncertainty.
Their perceptions of risks are affected by socioeconomic variables, and by their
psychological saliency and accessibility may produce significant distortions").
197. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic,91 CORNELL L. REv. 841,
870-75 (2005) (explaining that people usually treat the risk of even a catastrophic
harm "as essentially zero," and are reluctant to take precautionary steps, especially
when the benefits of doing so "will not be enjoyed until decades later").
198. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 334.
199. Id. at 333.
200. Id.; see also id at 332 ("[L]egal and political actors must be reasonably
responsive to social actors' demands; that is, they must see the demands of social
actors as both important and legitimate."); id. at 333 ("[W]here agencies have been
captured by industry, the demands of social actors may go unheeded.").
201. Babcock, Assuming PersonalResponsibility, supra note 5, at 156-59.

48

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXI

stakeholders learn about the company's performance. Examples of
such factors are the community's dependence on the local company
("the company town syndrome") 202 that is causing the environmental
harm,2 03 the serendipity of which issues revealed by disclosure will
motivate a community to put pressure on that company to reform its
behavior, and whether alliances form with more sophisticated,
politically powerful outside groups. 204 A company's size and ability
to withstand sales losses can determine how responsive it will be to
social pressure to reform its environmental behavior generated by
disclosure of some negative information.2 0 5 Companies can mute
negative information by "'buying off the local community's
objections" through providing some desired amenity, like a town park
or community center, or "by trying to 'win the hearts and minds'
through public relations campaigns in local schools and with local
community organizations." 206
202. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 333 ("[t]he imbalance of economic
power between companies and local communities may also weaken social license
pressures," citing as an example "the company town syndrome").
203. Id. at 324 ("the pressure on a company to be environmental responsible will
be substantially less when the community is dependent on the industry that is
causing the environmental problems").
204. Id. at 325 (saying it is hard to predict which issues "will concern nearby
residents, the special interest groups that will form in a particular location, the
strength of those groups, and the alliances they may make," any one of which can
influence the strength of local pressure on a company to reform its environmental
behavior). Gunningham also describes the problem that outlier opponents of a
particular company might sue or cause other problems, or a national environmental
group might demand additional changes to some negotiated agreement between a
facility and a local community or environmental group. Id. at 326. Either of these
events could disrupt whatever fragile accommodation the community has made
with a local firm to gain some improvement in its environmental performance. But
Testy probably would denounce these local arrangements to the extent that "the
redesign efforts accept the values and goals of the structures they seek to alter, then
the new corporate responsibility movement risks becoming domesticated and
failing to mount a significant challenge to the status quo." Testy, supra note 2, at
1229-30.
205. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 324-25 n.23 (noting that the "laggard
mill," i.e. one not responsive to social pressure "was part of a larger corporation
with more economic depth" than the one that was more responsive).
206. Id. at 326. Gunningham also worries that while programs which enhance
the procedural power of social actors, like those that require firms "to respond
formally to community concerns" or trigger judicial review, can influence a
corporation's environmental behavior, they run the risk of being "hijacked by small
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In the final analysis, while the public disclosure of a company's
environmental performance may be of sufficient importance to
warrant the development of programs to encourage its happening, the
flaws in those programs and the constraints on the company's
stakeholders to use that information to improve the company's
performance makes information as a motivator of improved corporate
environmental behavior problematic at best. These programs also do
little to inculcate an environmental ethic into the corporate
mindset.2 07
B. Voluntary PerformanceStandards

Voluntary performance standards can be sponsored by the
government, like EPA's National Environmental Performance Track
Program,208 or by industry trade association, like the chemical
industries' Responsible Care Program and the forest product
industry's Sustainable Forestry Initiative; and can be undertaken by
individual companies.209 The intent behind EPA's Environmental
Performance Track is to identify and recognize those corporate
leaders with the best environmental records. 2 10 Both government and
industry trade association programs encourage companies to commit
to improve their environmental performance by applying
environmental performance standards. Industry trade associations
require companies who participate in their programs to "commit to
environmental performance standards, usually stated qualitatively
rather than quantitatively, as a condition of membership in the

extremist elements, able to delay actions that most in the community or the country
support," or "by "well-meaning incompetents, more concerned with phantom
threats than real ones, or with impossibly expensive demands." Id. at 337-38.
However, he notes that either scenario would "encourage companies to invest in
community relations" and thus gain "sufficient reputational capital" to counteract
these possibilities from occurring). Id. at 338.
207. Testy, supra note 2, at 1236 (saying the social accountability approach only
gives "[p]ower to the shareholders, not principles for the managers").
208. According to Robin Bravender, EPA operated 46 voluntary programs in
2008, half of which were administered out of EPA's air office. Bravender, supra
note 4.
209. Strasser, supra note 134, at 546-47.
210. Id. at 546-47 (containing a description of the program).
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sponsoring organization," 211 unlike EPA which uses quantitative
metrics. 212 Participants receive awards, offers of technical assistance
and advice, and, with respect to EPA's programs, in some cases,
213
fewer regulatory inspections.
As companies who perform well are
publicly recognized, they and their industries receive a public
relations benefit of an improved environmental image.2 14
Occasionally, companies on their own adopt performance standards
committing to a specific level of environmental performance beyond
Although the latter type of voluntary
what is required.2 15
performance standards appears to be increasing, there are no studies
However, there are many studies of
of their effectiveness.216
government and trade association sponsored performance standards
programs, the results of which almost uniformly show that they "are
not associated with better environmental performance." 2 17
The consensus explanation of why programs like the chemical
industry's Responsible Care2 18 and EPA's Sustainable Slopes

211. Id. at 547 (discussing trade association voluntary performance standards
programs).
212. Id. at 546-47 ("Participants [in Performance Track] make a commitment to
environmental performance improvement as measured by one or more specific
metrics . . . [which] require

quantified improvement

in

some aspect of

performance.").
213. Id.
214. Id. at 547.
215. Id. (discussing company specific voluntary performance standards
programs).
216. Id. (saying so far, there has been "no systematic empirical evaluation of
their environmental performance effects").
217. Id. at 548. This part of the article is largely dependent on Kurt Strasser's
analysis of these programs. Strasser apparently did not study the effectiveness of
the Equator Principles (international banks framework of evaluating debt financing
of major public and private projects) or the financing principles adopted by three
major US banks (Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase & Co), which
embrace some elements of the Equator principles, Investor Network on Climate
Risk (CERES & UN Foundation) programs that Barnard listed as indicative that of
the fact that corporate environmental responsibility is becoming more of a fact in
corporate life. Barnard, supra note 77, at 291.
218. Strasser, supra note 134, at 548-49 (saying authors of a "study of the
chemical industry's Responsible Care program" hypothesized that its
ineffectiveness was the result of the program not requiring either "monitoring nor
enforcement").
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Program,219 intended to encourage ski areas to voluntarily improve
their environmental performance, failed so spectacularly is the
absence of effective monitoring and sanctions. 220 Firms that joined
such programs actually performed at a lower level than the average
performance level of their industry.22 ' Weak standards are another
problem and explain why participants in EPA's Strategic Goals
program for the metal finishing industry reduced their toxic
emissionS222 - there, the standards were lower than those set by the
industry's best practices group.22 3 Companies can join government
or trade association sponsored voluntary performance standards
programs "without either a demonstrated history of real
environmental effort or a real contemporary commitment to sustained
environmental improvement in the future." 224 Some studies show
that companies who join these programs early might well improve
their performance because "as a group, they had undertaken more
emission reduction efforts prior to joining, and they were subject to
greater political pressure regarding their emissions." 225 However,
these favorable results for early joiners are often "swamped by a
larger group of free riders who subsequently join. "1226

219. Id. at 549 (saying a study hypothesized that "the program's poor results
flowed from its lack of either third-party monitoring or sanctions for violations").
220. Id. at 553.
221. Id. at 553-54 (citing the chemical industries' Responsible Care program as
an example of such a program). Strasser interestingly found that companies that
pollute less join programs that monitor and sanction violators with expulsion, like
the forest products industry's Sustainable Forestry program. One conclusion that
Strasser draws from this last study is that program design can be extremely
important to its effectiveness. Id. at 554 (saying the study also showed that "firms
choose programs" in which they are going to participate and that "program design
may be quite important to observed environmental performance results").
222. Id. at 552-53.
223. Id at 553 n.67 (also noting that the "program back dated its baseline
performance period . . . in effect counting as improvements many gains that were

achieved before the Strategic Goals Program began"). Strasser also notes that the
program was discontinued because of low participation and failure to meet the
program's overall goals. Id. at 553.
224. Id. at 553 ("When real effort is required to improve environmental
performance, there is insufficient company commitment for the program to
succeed.").

225. Id. at 551.
226. Id.
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Data on their effectiveness also strongly suggest that "participation
in voluntary programs depends to a considerable extent on the
existence of a regulatory framework that would impose penalties on
firms that do not undertake proactive measures for self-regulation." 22 7
In other words, companies only participate in voluntary performance
standards programs if they think they are avoiding a specific
regulatory hammer, not because their corporate environmental culture
has changed. For example, a study evaluating the Department of
Energy's Climate Challenge program reported that "'voluntarism
seems to either have no effect ... or to contribute negatively to
emission reductions."' 228 The authors of the study "hypothesized that
the weak regulatory program for CO 2 emissions was the culprit,
making emissions reduction an environmental performance criterion
that did not receive serious attention by the companies."2 2 9 As Kurt
Strasser notes, if "this hypothesis is correct, it substantially undercuts
the idea that voluntary programs can improve environmental
performance beyond regulatory requirements." 230 Similarly, "firms
were more likely to join EPA's 33/50 voluntary [standards] program
when confronted with the prospect of regulatory controls as an
alternative."231
A study of this latter program concluded that
"[e]xpected gains due to public recognition and technical assistance
offered by the program and the potential to avoid liabilities and high
costs of compliance in the future under mandatory environmental
regulations provided incentives for participation in the program." 232
One obvious conclusion that can be drawn from both the Climate
227. Id. at 552 (citations omitted); see also Gronewold, supra note 181, at 1 (The
CDP reports that "the vast majority of companies are still waiting for governments
to come up with new domestic and international carbon control regimes before
making any longer-term commitments of their own," and saying further that,
"[fjear of future regulation still seems to be the determining factor in cases where
smaller supply chain companies are following their major corporate customers in
paying attention to greenhouse gas output."); Flatt, supra note 23, at 463 ("it seems
that public-private programs" can only work when there is a "threat of enforcement
or regulation, or some other incentive to comply;" a conclusion that "does not bode
well for the idea that the private sector can be trusted to accomplish environmental
policy initiatives without oversight").
228. Strasser, supra note 134, at 548.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 551.
232. Id. at 552.
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Challenge and EPA 30/50 program is that "[v]oluntary programs are
likely to be less effective without the backstop of mandatory
regulation." 2 33 EPA's Performance Track Program fared no better
according to an Inspector General's study of some of the companies
in the program.2 34 This is a "particularly discouraging [result] for a
program that . . . consciously targeted environmental leaders." 2 3 5
After reviewing the empirical data on the effectiveness of
government and industry-sponsored voluntary performance standards
programs, Strasser advocates a "go slow posture" towards their
inclusion in "public regulatory system for containing environmental
risks" because the data are not yet there to support that they actually
236
improve a company's environmental performance.
At minimum,
he suggests that their design should be improved with the inclusion of
"real monitoring and performance sanctions." 237 Flatt is highly
critical of voluntary performance standards, finding that "[t]he record
for pure voluntary compliance or compliance without enforcement
oversight from any level of government is abysmal." 23 8 Given the
failure of social norms to induce compliance with regulatory
requirements, let alone move beyond compliance, the likelihood that
these flawed voluntary performance standards programs without

233. Id.; see also Case, supra note 11, at 111 ("[L]egal mandates, rather than
market forces or voluntary self-regulatory behavior, are often the most important
motivation underlying corporate environmental behavior.").
234. Strasser, supranote 134, at 549.
235. Id. at 550. Perhaps this is why one of the first things the new Administrator
of EPA, Lisa Jackson did was to halt the Performance Track Program, which
environmentalists had condemned "as a public relations stunt." Bravender, supra
note 4, at 1. Indeed, the agency announced that it may reduce a number of its
voluntary programs and divert the resources supporting them to the agency's
regulatory efforts. Id. (reporting that Assistant Administrator for Air, Gina
McCarthy, said that "I believe that we've made tremendous progress with the
voluntary programs, but if we're going to begin to regulate more effectively, some
of the voluntary programs may no longer be the priority issues and we may want to
shirt resources").
236. Strasser, supra note 134, at 555 (advocating a policy of "benign neglect").
237. Id.
238. Flatt, supra note 23, at 462 (at best "[t]he record of engaging the private
sector on environmental protection other than as a regulated entity shows mixed
success").
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additional incentives will improve the environmental performance of
businesses seems extremely unlikely. 2 39
C. Environmental Management Systems

Environmental management systems (EMSs) seem to hold out the
greatest promise of actually reforming corporate behavior because
they work within and make adjustments to the corporation's existing
organizational structure so that the company can do a better job of
minimizing the environmental impacts of its activities. 2 40 Because
successful implementation of EMSs requires that the entire program
be integrated into "the company's existing internal governance
systems," making it part and parcel of "all other primary corporate
functions," 24 1 they "can have a fundamentally transformative effect
on a firm's organizational architecture and culture." 242 Companies

239. Id. at 465 ("environmental programs that are purely voluntary, with no other
incentives, seem unable to depend on social norms alone to create compliance,"
which makes them problematic").
240. Case, supra note 11, at 86 (an EMS can be thought of as "process
established to manage, control and minimize the environmental impact and effects
of an organization's activities and operations"); see also id. at 78 (defining an EMS
as "[a] regulatory strategy to encourage or mandate adoption of EMSs seeks to
change the behavior of organizations through the use of basic management
practices in order to 'align their actions and outcomes with broader [environmental
protection] objectives"'). For this reason, they are "included within a 'family of
legal instruments that reflect an emerging . . . 'reflexive law' conception of

regulation,"' the underlying theory of which "argues that complex social problems
caused or exacerbated by business activities are often beyond the capacity of legal
institutions alone to satisfactorily resolve." Id. at 105. Since "'the complexity of
environmental problems undermines both command and control and market
mechanisms as regulatory tools' . . . . 'fundamental structural change in the

everyday life of business institutions' is necessary to overcome the limitations of
traditional regulatory methods to induce socially desirable behavior." Id. at 105-06.
"Reflexive law strategies seek to shift regulatory efforts away from direct
regulation of firm behavior towards creation of structural processes that promote
self-regulatory behavior. These structural processes are intended to stimulate
communication between firms and societal stakeholders creating incentives for
corporate internalization of important societal norms." Id at 106.
241. Id. at 101.
242. Id. (saying that this should result in "cultural changes" in the corporation's
behavior that "will beneficially impact the firm's environmental performance and
outcomes"); Id at 101-02 ("the very nature of EMS design and implementation is
to 'embark on a prolonged and fundamental program[] of [organizational] change.'
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like EMS programs because they involve "the application of wellaccepted business principles to environmental protection," which
may explain why industry is their biggest proponent.2 4 3 EMS
programs can help companies avoid serious penalties, including
criminal penalties against their executives and managers,2 4 4 help
promote a model of industry self-regulation, especially attractive to
companies in heavily regulated industries,245 possibly help protect
against more stringent regulations,2 4 6 and help them gain reputational
benefits from being able to signal to their stakeholders, also the
media, that they are an environmentally responsible company and
their products and production processes are to be trusted.2 4 7 These
green management programs can also help a company coordinate
environmental management across separate business units, which can

Thus, a 'fully operational' EMS is expected to 'exert a powerful influence' over the
perceptions, actions and decision-making of managers and employees" (alteration
in original)).
243. Id. at 86 ("much of the momentum towards the widespread adoption of
voluntary, formal EMSs has been industry-driven"); see also id. at 87 (noting that
several prominent industry trade associations have required their members to adopt
environmental practices codes, such as those found in American Chemistry
Council's Responsible Care program and in the American Petroleum Institute's
Strategiesfor Today's EnvironmentalPartnershipprogram). Given the problems
with the Responsible Care Program, this may not be advancing the environmental
performance of those companies much.
244. Id. at 91-92 (saying also that another incentive for a company adopting a
self-auditing program as part of its EMS is the possible "waiver "of civil and
criminal penalties for regulatory violations discovered through regular
environmental audits if self-reported and promptly corrected."); see also id at 9293 (saying that the presence of an EMS can influence prosecutorial discretion as to
whether to bring criminal enforcement action or use it as potential mitigation at
sentencing). But see Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and
Deterrence,61 STAN. L. REv. 271 (2008-09) (generally arguing against the use of
criminal sanctions against business entities because of the collateral damage such
penalties can have and because entity criminal liability can work against companies
engaging in ex ante monitoring to detect violations).
245. Case, supra note 11, at 95.
246. Id. at 96 (such industries hope to use EMSs to "'preempt more stringent
environmental regulation,' as well as to encourage consideration of self-regulation
through formal EMSs as a viable alternative to government regulation").
247. Id. (saying "not to be ignored are "market pressures from consumers,
customers, and competitors, as well as social pressures, developcd through
'environmental groups, citizen groups and the media').
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lead to "innovation" and "unexpected efficiencies,"248 even to
"immediate and direct cost savings." 249
But, adopting an EMS program can be a major time consuming,
resource intensive, expensive undertaking, involving all levels of the
company250 that few companies are willing to take seriously. 25 1
Studies reveal that few of these programs establish goals beyond
what the company is already achieving, few require monitoring or
public disclosure of how they are working, and few impose
sanctions.252 Not surprisingly, these design lapses make the record of
regulatory compliance by individual companies with EMS programs

248. Standish, supra note 124, at 11.
249. Strasser, supra note 134, at 542. But see id at 543 (expressing the concern
that "such "performance improvements may be a one-time result of directed
management attention, rather than an indicator of future improvements").
250. Case, supra note 11, at 102 ("employees at all levels, from top management
to front line workers" must be "involved in design and implementation of the
EMS"); see also id. ("the existing attitudes and commitments of firm managers
towards environmental concerns may well be an independent variable affecting the
ability of formal EMSs to induce positive corporate behavioral change"); Strasser,
supra note 134, at 545 (Gunningham's study of paper mills seems to confirm that
result in that "the style of environmental management was the most important
factor [in companies going beyond regulatory compliance], more important that the
national regulatory regime, the mill's corporate size, or it earning").
251. Case, supra note 11, at 89-90 (explaining that some elements of an effective
EMS program include: (1) "a written environmental policy. . . . ;(2) a process for

identifying the 'environmental aspects and impacts of [the organization's]
operations,' which should include applicable regulatory requirements; (3) a
system for establishing "priorities, objectives, and 'targets for continuous
improvement' in the company's environmental performance "based on 'the
environmental aspects and impacts' of its operations. This system should: (1)
"create an organizational understanding of what implementation of the EMS is
expected to achieve;" (2) "'assign clear responsibilities for [system]
implementation, training, monitoring [system performance, and [for the
undertaking of] corrective action;' and (3) provide for "a process of periodic
evaluation and refinement").
252. See Case, supra note 11, at 89 (listing as important to the effectiveness of
EMSs "the ambitiousness of the environmental objectives" managers are required
to establish, the level of monitoring required, whether meaningful sanctions are
imposed on companies that either do not perform well or that have weak ineffective
programs, and "'the transparency of the EMS and of the organization's
performance to the public"'). See generally Strasser, supra note 134 (describing
and evaluating environmental management systems and voluntary performance
standards).
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poor. 253 While there are some data about the possible effectiveness
is not yet a robust empirical answer to
of EMS programs, 254 there isn
whether implementing one actually improves a company's record of
regulatory compliance. 255 With respect to making a company's
production processes greener and encouraging it to produce greener
products, one study concluded that the rigidity and specificity of
EMS programs impeded a company from engaging in this "turbulent

process." 256
Case warns that "the promise of an EMS-based approach to
environmental regulatory reform should not be overblown. Not

253. Strasser, supra note 134, at 546 (noting that while EMS programs "are
generally associated with better environmental performance on regulated
discharges and on nonregulated resource use," the record of regulatory compliance
by specific companies that have implemented them is decidedly "less positive").
Strasser also notes that EMS programs are not generally responsible for the
production of greener products or processes. Id. at 543.
254. Id. at 540; see also id at 537 ("[m]ost of the empirical studies find that
implementation of an EMS is associated with better performance on regulated
discharges"); id (reporting that a leading study by the National Database on
Environmental Management Systems found that the 'introduction of an EMS can
be expected to be at least somewhat beneficial to the environmental performance of
most facilities, as well as to their operating and management efficiencies, and in
some cases to their regulatory compliance patterns' (quoting NAT'L DATABASE ON
ENVTL. MGMT., SYs., DEPT. OF PUB. POLICY, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: DO THEY IMPROVE PERFORMANCE?,

PROJECT FINAL REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at ES-25 (2003))).

255. Strasser, supra note 134, at 541-42 ("while currently there is a significant
amount of intriguing data, a workable empirical answer to whether implementing
an EMS is associated with improved regulatory compliance is not yet available").
Strasser does note that "[fjirms with more comprehensive EMSs tended to have
greater improvement in overall environmental performance." Id. at 538; see also id.
at 539-40 (reporting that on two studies that "found that EMS adoption was the
important factor for environmental performance, and that certification [for ISO
compliance] was not associated with further improvements" because certification
of compliance with the [ISO] standard "is done primarily as a representation to the
outside stakeholders, while it is adoption of the EMS that actually impacts
performance").
256. Id. at 544. Strasser finds this conclusion unsurprising because of the
"individual and institutional thinking required for far-reaching product redesign
innovation," and because ""[t]he focus of attention in implementing an EMS is on
the particular facility, because it is within a particular facility that most of the real
work for an EMS takes place;" whereas the changes required to innovate a
production line or process are more likely to be companywide. Id.
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nearly enough is known about potential causal links between formal
EMS implementation and corporate environmental performance
improvements, or whether the social benefits of EMS-based
strategies will exceed their social cost."2 57 The data do, however,
make clear that green management programs should never be
considered a substitute for "direct legal controls on corporate
environmental behavior." 258
Studies of each of the three environmental CSR initiatives information disclosure, voluntary performance standards, and EMS
programs - not only show that they have been largely ineffective, but
also that they have significant design flaws. 2 59 These design flaws
may explain why their benefits inure more to businesses than to
society as a whole and why they appear to be "pseudo events" and
not reflective of a "true paradigm shift" in corporate behavior. 260 The
record with EMS programs on improving a firm's regulatory
compliance is probably the clearest and most positive. Yet even it
yields conflicting results.
Assuming for a moment that there might be a public benefit in
properly designed environmental CSR programs, the next part of the
article identifies what such design changes might look like. It
concludes, however, that no matter how these three initiatives are
improved unless they are made mandatory and thus enforceable by
the government or third parties, they will not reform corporate
behavior. How that might be done is the subject of the last part of the
article.

257. Case, supra note 11, at 109.
258. Id. ("[a]n EMS-based regulatory strategy is unlikely to ever be a feasible
substitute for direct legal controls on corporate environmental behavior").
259. See Kenny, supra note 139, at 459 (saying with respect to corporate codes
of conduct that the principal criticisms against them are that they are "self-imposed,
self-regulated, and voluntary, and thus lacked a definitive enforcement
mechanism); id. at 458 ("[T]here is no neutral party to 'blow the whistle on human
rights violations' and therefore, no assurance that the monitors will not be unduly
influenced by corporate pressure on inspection reports. As a result, many similarly
situated external codes have been largely ineffective.").
260. Bamard, supra note 1, at 291.
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VI. WAYS TO REDESIGN ENVIRONMENTAL CSR PROGRAMS TO BE
MORE EFFECTIVE

Given the problems with environmental regulations and their
enforcement, it may well be that effective environmental CSR
initiatives could fill current regulatory gaps and provide a more
pervasive and higher level of protection from harm than the current
programs do. Therefore, it is worth examining whether these
initiatives can be redesigned to serve as a useful supplement to
existing regulatory requirements. The review of CSR initiatives in
the previous part of this article indicates that there are three major
areas for improvement: self-audits of the effectiveness of CSR
initiatives, public disclosure of the results of those audits, and
sanctions for companies, their employees and officers, who promise
to undertake a CSR initiative and then fail to do so, or only support
the initiative in a half-hearted way. 26 1 However, a closer look at the
cost-benefit balance that a company will engage in before it obligates
itself to make these changes without fail tilts towards the company
doing nothing.
A. Require Monitoring (Auditing) of CorporateImplementation
of CSR Initiatives

One of the frequent criticisms of CRS initiatives is that companies,
or better yet outside neutral observers, do not systematically monitor
their implementation or performance.2 6 2 Thus, there is no way for the
261. Beyond the scope of this article are proposals to change the structure of
corporations, such as the team production model (TPM) proposed by my former
colleagues Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair.
Their ideal corporate model
"conceptualizes corporate participants - including managers, shareholders,
employees, creditors, and local communities - as a team" that distributes "the
collective production (or rents) . . . through some allocative method." See Testy,
supra note 2, at 1233-35. Testy criticizes this model because '[w]hen rights are
allocated on the basis of what one can bargain and pay for, those with more
resources will always come out ahead. And they will stay ahead too." Id. at 1234.
However, a plus to the TPM approach is that it "does envision the corporation as a
collective enterprise, it holds out substantial potential for recasting the duties the
stewards of that enterprise might owe to those nonshareholder constituents affected
by its reach." Id. at 1234-35.
262. Williams, supra note 158, at 416 ("the goal [of corporate social disclosure]
is to create a format for social auditing that would permit the dissemination of an
accurate synopsis of a company's social, political, and environmental actions.");
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public to judge how well the programs are performing, let alone to
develop comparative information, which could encourage companies
to improve their performance. 263 While there a lot of groups that
informally monitor corporate behavior, like environmentalists, the
media, competitors, government regulators, local communities, and
economic markets, 264 and who "enforce the terms of the social
license directly (e.g., through shaming and adverse publicity) and the
terms of the economic license (e.g., generating consumer boycotts of
environmentally damaging products), and the regulatory license (e.g.,
through citizen suits or political pressure for regulatory
initiatives),"26 5 that oversight is an incomplete "patchwork."2 6 6

see also id ("Expanded social disclosure to create such transparency would
generally include specific information on the products companies produce and
where that production takes place; on the companies' law compliance structures; on
their labor relationships, both directly and through subcontractors; on their
domestic and global environmental effects; and on corporate charitable and
political contributions.").
263. See, e.g., Gronewold, supra note 181 (reporting that 89% CDP members
indicated that they intended to calculate the carbon footprints of their suppliers and
to inform them of strategies to reduce their emissions, only 20% of the 2,2000
companies who participate in the project "say that they have the ability to
accurately measure or estimate their suppliers' output of greenhouse gas
pollution"). This inability to monitor makes meaningless the threat by 56% to drop
companies from their list of suppliers if the companies do not calculate their
emissions or adopt the suggestions of how to reduce them. Id (reporting on the
number of companies prepared to drop suppliers).
264. See Branson, supra note 30, at 642 ("the number of third party monitors,
whether journalists or organizations, has spread beyond the investment
community"); see also Case, supra note 11, at 104 (referring to Karkkainen's
article, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI

and Performance

Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001), and
saying "the informal monitoring regime, triggered by public information disclosure
imposes diverse forms of social and market-based pressure on corporate
environmental behavior .. . [, which] includes self-monitoring from firm managers
and external monitoring performed by industry competitors, government regulators,
local communities, and economic markets").
265. Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 336.
266. See Branson, supra note 30, at 643-44 ("All of these initiatives in
monitoring of social performance nonetheless result in a patchwork. The array of
information available thus is incomplete and is also dependent upon the
sophistication, industriousness and research tools available to the investor or
monitor."); see also id at 643 ("The information revolution and the Internet have
added to the corporate social responsibility data that are available to monitors of
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An effective program that monitors the implementation and
performance of a CSR initiative267 should be supported by "adequate
resources, report[s] at a sufficiently high level in the corporation, and
[consist of] . .. a program that will reasonably discover violations of

law or corporate policy." 268 It should have "the support and
involvement of senior management" and require that senior
management "communicate to employees the company's
commitment to compliance." 269 Compliance with internal audit
programs should "be the assigned responsibility of high-level
corporate management," and these programs should be periodically
reviewed and adjusted as necessary to make improvements. 270
Establishing such a program is no trivial undertaking for a
business.2 7 1
social performance, whether they be third party monitors or investors
themselves.").
267. Although the elements of an effective self-audit program are drawn from
internal legal compliance programs, the principal goal of which is to identify
regulatory violations before they occur, many of the elements of these programs are
easily transferrable to programs designed to audit the effectiveness of CSR
initiatives.
268. Martin, supra note 80, at 18.
269. Id. at 16; see also id. at 18 (saying communications by corporations about
internal audit programs and the company's expectations must have "the right tone,"
meaning that it must "originate with individuals in the corporation who are
correctly placed to send a message that has authority behind it," as they are an
essential element of an effective legal compliance program).
270. Id. at 19.
271. Id. at 17 (listing among the elements of an adequate compliance program
under the Guidelines, the need for a company "to establish compliance standards
and procedures," "assign specific high-level personnel overall responsibility to
oversee compliance" with those standards, institution of "steps to communicate its
standards and procedures to all employees effectively," citing as examples required
participation in training programs or by dissemination easily understood
information, "reasonable steps to achieve compliance with its standards, by
utilizing monitoring and auditing systems reasonable designed to detect criminal
conduct . . . and by having in place and publicizing a reporting system whereby

employees and other agents can report criminal conduct by others in the
organization without fear of retribution," and the institution of "appropriate
disciplinary mechanisms"); see also id at 18 (saying a reviewer of the adequacy of
such programs should ask "has the corporation identified risk areas that deserve
internal audit attention? Does the internal audit plan reemphasize these risk areas?
Does the corporation have a means of judging whether it is complying with laws on
a regular basis?").
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Although companies can benefit from monitoring the performance
of their CSR programs, like gathering information about how to make
their operations more efficient 272 and regulatory compliant, 273 and
improve relations with their stakeholders, there are also significant
costs, such as the need to develop "a significant and very costly
bureaucracy" of lawyers, trainers, and environmental experts. 2 74
Time and money spent on monitoring and analyzing the results is
diverted from production, sales or other necessary profit-making
activities of the company, which can increase the price of its products
or reduce profits. 2 75 Information collected through these programs
may require expensive changes in how the facility is operated,
perhaps requiring that it be shut down while "environmental or safety
fixes" are made-some of these expenditures may be "to remedy
violations that might otherwise have remained undiscovered." 276 A
company that discovers a regulatory violation through an EMS audit
may face fines, adverse publicity that negatively affects "consumer
perceptions and stock prices, large litigation expenses, and potential
debarment from government business," as well as "a hostile litigation
environment in which those good faith efforts are viewed as mere
tools for adversaries to exploit" and where the discovery of a
potential violation becomes a "roadmap for further discovery" in the
hands of its adversaries.277 A company that effectively audits the
performance of its CSR program may also handicap itself when
compared to a company that does not do this, enabling the other

272. Id. at 16 (saying a fully integrated monitoring or self-audit program in
addition "will enhance teamwork communication and understanding between the
legal and operations functions").
273. See id. ("A compliance program supported by both management and
employees throughout the company will help to fully integrate compliance in the
company's operations."). Improvement in a company's regulatory compliance
record will also obviously help it avoid fines, the possibility of contractual
disbarment, and the cost of defense counsel and may gain leniency from
prosecutors. Id. at 15-16.
274. Id. at 15.
275. Id. ("every hour and every dollar devoted to compliance programs are
diverted from production, sales, or other necessary profit-making activities of the
company," which are "reflected in the prices of the company's products or
absorbed as a reduction of profits," which, "in turn, has an impact on a company's
long term ability to compete, pay its employees and hire new employees").
276. Id.
277. Id.
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company to seize "a competitive advantage" 27 8 by being able to
ignore the ineffectiveness of its CSR initiatives while still reaping
their benefits. Finally, internal audit programs can change the culture
of a company, creating "an austere, overly rigid working
environment," which may conflict with efforts to inculcate a
"cooperative team approach," 279 making the company a less attractive
place in which to work.
Given the substantiality of the costs a company may incur from
adopting an effective internal monitoring program balanced by its
more limited benefits it is unlikely that the company will adopt this
improvement to its CSR program on its own initiative. Even if
companies could be persuaded to build into their CSR programs an
effective self-auditing program, such programs "are not ends in
themselves; they are risk-management tools to help the company
achieve its broader goals of enhancing shareholder value and
profitability by being a responsible corporate citizen on a long-term
basis." 280 As such, they do little to change a corporation's mindset
about its environmental responsibilities to society at large.
B. Require Public Transparency on the Effectiveness of CSR
Programs

Closely related to the first suggested improvement is requiring
companies to publicly disclose information on the effectiveness of
their CSR initiatives. The company's customers and investors have a
legitimate interest in knowing whether a business' representations
about the benefits of its environmental CSR programs are correct as
that knowledge will inform them about the company's environmental
behavior and the extent to which they should buy the company's
products or invest in it. Greater public transparency about a
company's environmental performance gives the company's
stakeholders, particularly community and environmental activists and

278. Id.
279. Id. at 15-16 (noting in addition that these programs "appear to require an
internal criminal justice system approach that can risk defaming employees,
seemingly invading their privacy and triggering other labor relations problems").
280. Id. at 16; see also id. at 18 (recommending in addition that firms develop "a
code of ethics or business conduct" which "should include aspirational goals of the
corporation as well as standards of business conduct related both to legal
compliance and general organizational requirements."
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the media, the information they need to act as "effective watchdogs
and de facto regulators, shaming and otherwise pressuring companies
into beyond-compliance environmental performance" 28 1 and to
improve their environmental record. As Cynthia Williams points out,
"there is a 'shrinking quality' to harmful actions people will take if
they are required to expose those actions to the 'disinfectant' of full

public disclosure." 282
However, there are also obvious disincentives for companies when
it comes to disclosing their environmental performance, not the least
of which is the possibility of litigation.2 8 3 There is also the
possibility that a company that discloses the lack of success of its
CSR initiatives will lose customers and risk damaging its
"reputational capital." Such negative exposure might also trigger an
adverse reaction by financial markets, particularly with socially
responsible investors.2 8 4 And most companies do not want to expose
themselves to community pressure to change their business
operations or practices and to the negative publicity that might flow

281. See Gunningham et al., supra note 10, at 336-37 (noting the importance of
information disclosure provisions, such as the Toxic Release Inventory); see also
Branson, supra note 30, at 645 n.97, ("individuals can exert a greater force for
environmental good by pressuring corporations and governments than by lecturing
their Navigator-driving friends. Or by spending two years in a tree [sic]"(alteration
in original) ( quoting Sharon Begley, The Battle for Plant Earth, NEWSWEEK, Apr.
24, 2000, at 50)).
282. Williams, supra note 158, at 420.
283. Information disclosure may also have the perverse result of discouraging
companies from participating in other environmental CSR initiatives, like EMS
programs, if those programs require significant public information disclosure. Case,
supra note 11, at 111 ("[T]o the extent that linking formal EMS adoption with
public information disclosure mechanisms is deemed important to maximize the
potential of management-based regulatory strategies to foster positive corporate
behavioral change, the 'under-inclusiveness problem' inherent in voluntary
programs may become even more pronounced.

. . . Thus, notwithstanding the

public policy benefits that could result from such disclosure, firms may be less
likely to voluntarily participate in incentive-based EMS programs, if significant
formal public information disclosure is required.").
284. Kirkland, supra note 176, at 1 ("concern about corporate disclosure has
become a hot-button issue for environmental and investor advocacy groups" and
that "SEC is reexamining shareholder concerns that companies are sidestepping
requirements to disclose climate-related liability they face from greenhouse gas
emissions, regulations, rising commodity prices, potential property damage and the
long-term costs associated with replacing equipment and infrastructure").
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from being unresponsive to such requests. Once again, the balance
seems to tilt in favor of companies being disinclined to provide
information on how their environmental CSR initiatives are actually
performing and thus, against companies redesigning their CSR
programs to include a public disclosure element.2 8 5
C. Require Sanctionsfor False Representationsand
Noncompliance with CSR Programs

As currently designed, there are no external or internal sanctions
for companies, or their employees and officers, 286 who make false
285. Recognizing that business will not release information about their
environmental performance voluntarily, Cynthia Williams recommends using
federal security law to assure the disclosure of such information. Williams, supra
note 158, at 421 ("If one believes that the possibility of liability is an important
motivator, for some companies, to comply with the law, it is also potentially useful
that there could be liability consequences under the federal securities law for
misleading disclosure, or misleading non-disclosure"). Indeed, in response to
petitions from environmental and investor groups, like the $200 billion CALPERS,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently issued new guidelines on
disclosure of climate change information. See Joel Kirkland, SEC Issues Climaterisk Guidance Despite Tough PoliticalEnvironment, CLIMATEWIRE, January 28,
2010, at 1, available at http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/print/2010/01/28/3
(reporting on the SEC's issuance of a disclosure guidance document, which
although "doesn't carry the same force of law as a formal regulation, . . . public

companies consider it binding"). The guidance document requires companies to
"consider whether existing laws or pending legislation and regulations are a risk,
and whether climate accords carry some financial risk. It also directs companies to
consider whether actual and potential physical impacts should be disclosed,
including whether there is a risk of increasing insurance claims in coastal areas due
to severe weather or sea level changes." Id; see also John Broder, S.E. C. Adds Risk
Related to Climate to Disclosure List, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 28, 2010, at B1 (reporting
that "[t]he commission said that companies could be helped or hurt by climaterelated lawsuits, business opportunities or legislation and should promptly disclose
such potential impacts... . and that including climate risks among other disclosures
was a logical step."); Kirkland, supra note 176, at 1 (saying the guidance document
also says "[b]usiness trends matter, too. 'Legal, technological, political and
scientific developments regarding climate change may create new opportunities or
risks for companies . . . [and] companies shouldn't ignore how climate change

affects their competitive positions," such as "less demand for energy-intensive
goods that result in heavy industrial emissions or, on the flip side, rising demand
for 'green' goods and services that produce less emissions").
286. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 244, at 295 ("Individuals ... are more
likely to commit misconduct when they derive a personalbenefit from doing so.").
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representations about the effectiveness of their environmental CSR
programs, let alone who fail to disclose information to the public,
meet voluntary performance standards, or implement green
As these are private
management programs as promised.
undertakings by corporations, the government cannot enforce against
such lapses. While "social license demands can be enforced by
augmenting legal enforcement mechanisms, such as pressuring
regulators to enforce more vigilantly and more directly by filing
citizen suits," 287 these actions are ineffective against non-legally
mandated CSR programs. Therefore, while "[s]ocial actors thereby
lend extra enforcement energy and weight to existing regulatory and
legal license requirements, pushing regulated enterprises toward full
legal compliance-and even to invest in beyond-compliance
measures that provide a margin of safety against violations," 288 none
of this is relevant, if the initiative does not have a regulatory
foundation. Meaningful internal sanctions against acts of omission or
malfeasance by a company's managers and employees, especially if
their imposition is publicized and the company is concerned about its
"reputational capital," could function as a good substitute.2 8 9
Failure to punish lax employees can send a negative message to
other employees about the importance of the environmental CSR
program and will not encourage the poorly performing employee to
improve her performance. Punishment says the offender's act was
wrong and will not be tolerated. 290 Being sanctioned can also shame
an employee before her peers, the possibility of which, together with
other sanctions, like fines, pay reductions, or loss of leave, may
motivate better performance. 291 If a way could be found to sanction
287. Gunningham et al., supranote 10, at 319.
288. Id.
289. This may explain why some of the better performing companies opt to join
trade association programs that have real sanctions for non-compliance with their
rules. See discussion supra at Part V.B.
290. Garvey, supra note 24, at 741 ("[T]he expressive dimension of punishment"
and saying "Punishment ... is a form of language .. . [, which] [a]t the very least . .
. says that the offender's act was wrong and will not be tolerated. In a word,
punishment, unlike civil sanctions, condemns. It is 'a conventional device for the
expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation."').
291. See Barnard, supra note 1, at 297 (saying General Electric, which holds its
managers accountable and stakes "raises and promotions on the successful
achievement of internal environmental goals," is an example of a company that has
an effective internal monitoring program); see also id at 301 (reporting on the
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the head of the company, the resultant shame and loss of
"reputational capital" for the individual and her company could be
significant.292 But, it seems unlikely that a company will be willing
to do this, let alone impose sanctions against lower level employees
and managers precisely because of the possibility of adverse publicity
when sanctions are revealed and the resultant economic and
reputational harm to the company.2 9 3
insurance company Swiss Re "beginning to ask questions about environmental
practices when deciding whether to sell or renew directors' and officers' insurance
policies").
292. See Vandenbergh, supra note 21, at 132 ("The impact of negative publicity
on the managers' self-esteem was a more effective deterrent than formal
sanctions"); see also Barnard, supra note 77, at 968 ("High status business leaders
may be especially susceptible to shaming rituals. 'They are the people most likely
to worry about public appearances, to be vulnerable to moralistic or judgmental
social groups, to deter to authority and to be relative conventional in attitudes
toward law and order."'(emphasis added) (quoting Toni M. Massaro, Shame,
Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880, 1934 (1991)); id
("They are also the people most likely to be concerned about maintaining the
appearance of business competence and professional accomplishment. Also,
because they regard themselves as participants in a 'culture of honor,' they are
especially sensitive to the opinions of peers."); id at 969 (calling the result of
discomforting public exposure a "reputational rub-off' (quoting V.S. Khanna,
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1477, 1510 (1996)). But see id at 999 (warning that "woodshedding" and the
"corporate icon procedure" where the CEO appears in court "is likely to have a
measurable impact on lower- to mid-level employees where deterrence would
really count").
293. There is a substantial literature on figuring out what the appropriate sanction
should be for deviant behavior, especially when the sanction is imposed externally,
which could have some bearing on internal sanctions, especially if they are
publicized. See, e.g., Feeley, supra note 25, at 209 ("Advocates of increased
sentencing hope that corporate wrong-doers 'respond to what they see' in cases like
Bernard Ebbers - sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for accounting fraud and refrain from crime"); Hamdani & Klement, supra note 244, at 274 (saying
firms faced with losing their permits or being barred from government contracts or
that suffer "irreparable damage" to their reputations can go out of business); id at
298 (saying when a firm goes out of business there is an additional risk of collateral
damage to innocent parties, "such as the firm's employees, suppliers, and even
entire communities."); id at 276 ("When they cannot eliminate misconduct, firms
might respond to the threat of harsh sanctions by reducing their monitoring effort.
After all, if the firm is about to unravel regardless of its investment in compliance
then why bother?" More precisely, the marginal reduction in expected liability
might be too low to justify additional monitoring efforts); Richard A. Posner,
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Since there will be serious problems getting companies voluntarily
to audit the effectiveness of their environmental CSR initiatives, let
alone disclose the results of those audits or impose sanctions on
themselves when these initiatives fail to meet what are probably
considered to be only aspirational goals, it seems highly dubious that
any of them will achieve real change in corporate behavior or
improve the environment. Yet, if companies could be compelled to
have effective environmental CSR programs and then be held
accountable for their representations about their benefits, there might
be a positive effect on the environment. Not only do these programs
hold out hope of filling gaps in the regulatory framework, but also
because they actually work within the corporate structure to reform it,
they have a good chance of transforming corporate environmental
behavior for the better.
VII.COMPELLING COMPLIANCE WITH

CSR INITIATIVES

Cynthia Williams says that while well-designed voluntary
initiatives "are extremely important self-regulatory mechanisms ....
ultimately, . . . mandatory approaches will be necessary to address
concerns of corporate accountability under conditions of economic
globalization." 294 One way to achieve corporate accountability for
environmental CSR initiatives is to incorporate them into regulatory
permits295 or compliance agreements. Doing this would make them

Creating andEnforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT'L REV.
L. & EcON. 369, 372 (1999) ("A sanction should be one of the appropriate
magnitude; if it is too severe, people will be overdeterred and refrain from efficient
actions. A sanction should not be too costly; the cost will depend largely on how
often it has to be administered, that is, on the frequency of the violation of the
norm."); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence
Social Norms: Commodifying California'sCarpool Lanes, 75 IN. L.J. 1231, 1276
(2000) (discussing enforcement of the non-smoking norm, and saying "[w]hat is
required for the inducements not to backfire is that punishments be proportional
and that there be alternatives or accommodation for smokers."). But see Hamdani
& Klement, supra note 244, at 290 ("[T]he threat of going out of business can
compel firms to make an effort - perhaps even an excessive one - to prevent their
agents from breaking the law.").
294. Williams, supra note 158, at 422.
295. Although it seems counter-intuitive to think that some companies may agree
to the conditioning of their permits to include some or all of these programs, it is
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enforceable not only by the government, but by third parties like
environmental organizations. EPA could insist on this happening
when a company agrees to participate in a government sponsored
CSR program, like EPA's Performance Track Program, in exchange
for its receiving some form of regulatory relief or positive public
recognition. Since the business benefits from participating in the
government program, EPA would also be in a strong position to
require that the company monitor and disclose to the public the
results of its participation and impose sanctions on officers and
managers who fail to comply with the program's terms. However,
this is clearly not a perfect solution, given the need to rely on followup federal enforcement, which will be problematic at best, and the
barriers to private enforcement litigation.2 96
Another way to compel a company to implement its CSR programs
and fulfill the representations made in them about their
environmental benefits would be to view the representations that the
company has made about their effectiveness and the company's good
environmental behavior as warranties; promises that create both a
contractual and moral duty of performance on the company.29 7 The
company's stakeholders rely on these warranties (promises) when
they purchase that company's products or invest in it, and the
company breaches them when the programs and the companies do
not perform as promised.
"The traditional definition of the term contract is 'a promise or set
of promises for breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."' 298 In
turn, a promise is depicted as "a manifestation of intention to act or
refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promise
in understanding that a commitment has been made,"2 9 9 and "may be
possible that they might of the internal benefits to them of CSR programs
previously noted.
296. Babcock, supra note 16, at 11-12 (discussing the barriers facing
environmental plaintiffs, particularly establishing Article III standing).
297. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS, § 1.2 (4th ed. 2007) ("[T]he term 'promise' includes not only the

physical manifestations that give rise to an assurance - the parties' words or
conduct - but also the moral duty to make good the assurance by subsequent
performance.").
298. Id. at § 1.1.
299. Id. at § 1.2.
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expressed in the form of a warranty."3oo A seller's promise or
warranty about the goods she is selling, whether the soundness of a
horse or, in the case of a business firm, the effectiveness of its
environmental CSR initiatives and its own reputation as a good
environmental citizen, "becomes part of the basis of the bargain,"
which courts will treat as a constructive promise - "an obligation
imposed by law that is treated as if it were a promise." 30 ' The
promisor (warrantor) "has assumed responsibility" for these
statements of fact and can be held accountable if the facts turn out to
be untrue and someone has relied on these representations to their
detriment. 30
A customer or investor who believes that she is
engaging in socially responsible behavior when she patronizes or
invests in the company based on the company's self-proclaimed good
environmental behavior and/or employment of good environmental
practices, in some cases even paying higher prices for the company's
products believing that they have been produced by an
environmentally conscious company, is injured when that
representation turns out to be untrue. The law recognizes that injury
and provides a remedy for it. 3 03
Alternatively, a firm's stakeholders could sue as third party
beneficiaries of a contract between EPA or an industry trade
association, and a company, where a company promised to undertake
certain initiatives to improve its environmental performance in
exchange for benefits, such as an enhancement of its "reputation
capital" or a reduction in government oversight inspections, and then
does not perform. The injury to the company's stakeholders who
have relied on these representations in their choice of products

300. 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN & JOSEPH M. PERILLON, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
1.14 (rev. ed., West Publishing Co. 1993); see also id. ("A warranty is an assurance
by one party to a contract of the existence of a fact upon which the other party may
rely. It is intended precisely to relieve the promisee of any duty to ascertain the

facts .

. ."

(quoting J. Hand, Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784

(2d Cir. 1946))).
301. Id.
302. Id.; See also WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 297, at § 1.1 ("Contract law is
designed to protect the expectations of the contracting parties.").
303. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 297, at § 1.1. ("[W]hen a promisor warrants
that goods are of a particular quality, when in fact they are not; the promisor's
manifestation in such a case operates as a commitment or promise that the promisor
will be responsible if the facts are not manifested.").
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produced by that company or in deciding to invest in it would be the
304
same as in a breach of warranty situation.
Assuming that these arrangements between the companies and
either EPA or the trade association are contracts - i.e. there has been
an offer, an acceptance of the offer, and, consideration 305 - there
remains the matter of establishing that the company's stakeholders
are the intended beneficiary of those agreements. 306 One way of
demonstrating that parties are the intended beneficiaries of a contract
is to focus on "the ultimate benefit for the third party." 307 Under this
approach, one could argue that the company's stakeholders are the

304. Other possible approaches include filing complaints with the FTC under
section 5 of the FTCA alleging fraudulent misrepresentation or compelling the
government to condition its procurement practices in favor of companies that have
taken meaningful steps to improve their corporate behavior. See Kenny, supra note
139, at 470 (also discussing how some cities, such as San Francisco have enacted
anti-sweatshop ordinances restricting the use of contractors to those who commit to
safe work environments). However, both these alternatives are beyond the scope of
this article, which looks at litigation, not administrative approaches to compelling
implementation of CSR programs.
305. Perhaps the most problematic of the three elements to establish under these
circumstances is what the consideration is for the bargained for agreement between
the business firm and either EPA or the trade association. The company's
consideration might be the cost it undertakes to implement the specific CSR
initiatives, which are required for its entry into the government or trade associations
CSR program and for the government or trade association the effort it made to
design a program that would attract the company.
306. Joseph Siprut, Third-Party Beneficiary Basics: When Can Noncontracting
Parties Sue for Breach?, 93 ILL. B.J. 462, 463 (2005); see also id (saying
incidental beneficiaries have no rights under the contract). See generally Orna S.
Paglin, Criteriafor Recognition of Third PartyBeneficiaries'Rights,24 New Engl.
L. Rev. 63 (1989) (discussing the evolution of the intent standard, the various
evidentiary tests that both courts and scholars have placed on it, and its increasing
liberalization); id at 111 (worrying that the way the doctrine has evolved has
"detach[ed] this field of contract law [third party beneficiary law] from its natural
context - that of bargaining and of consensual liability"); id. (attributing the
transformation of "what is essentially a consensual liability field into an imposed
liability field," in part because "courts are tempted to use third party beneficiary
law as a tool for implementing desired social and economic policies, even when to
do so thwarts the parties' intentions").
307. Paglin, supra note 306, at 69-70 (noting also that this test was favored by
Corbin, citing 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 777, at 24-25 (1951 & Supp. 1971),
although noting that Corbin's analysis "overlooks the complications inherent in
third party beneficiary contracts").
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intended beneficiaries of contacts between companies and EPA or
industry trade associations because the ostensible reason the principal
parties entered into these agreements-to achieve a cleaner
environment-is of direct benefit to its environmentally conscious
customers and investors for whom the achievement of a clean
environment is a primary goal. 30 8 Some courts do not even bother to
try to divine the intent of the principal parties and "instead look at
which decision will best "accommodate particular policies," such as a
desired social or economic policy. 309 Thus, the clear social benefit
behind policies to protect the environment might provide an
alternative way to establish the necessary contractual intent to benefit
the company's environmentally conscious stakeholders.
Courts also look closely at the language of agreements for clear
promissory language that runs in favor of third parties,"o and with
respect to employment contracts, find publication of the terms of the
agreement "in a manner that the employees knew of its contents and
reasonably relied on it," and then either began to work or continued
working, thereby accepting the offer, to be sufficient.311
The
parallels are clear-companies flaunt the existence of their CSR
308. See id., at 74-75 (saying that a popular test of determining the intent of the
contracting parties to benefit a third party is "whether the promisor has undertaken
to render a performance directly to the third person[,]" and saying that this test
should not refer to whom performance was promised, but to "the subject of the
promised performance"). This test would also seem to favor the inclusion of the
public as third party beneficiaries of any contract between companies and another
party because the subject of the promised performance again directly benefits the
public.
309. Id. at 80. Clear examples of programs of social import where a court may
"easily" discern "a supportive 'intent to benefit"' are statutory welfare programs.
Id. at 81; see also id. at 112 (describing how courts use the process of
supplementation and public policy considerations to resolve disputes about third
party beneficiaries and disguise this process .'as a quest for the parties' intentions .
. . even when the true rationale for their decision has nothing to do with this
criterion. Only rarely do the courts admit that they police the parties' agreements
in order to carry out social or economic policies"').
310. See Kenny, supra note 139, at 460 (analyzing the question in the context of
employment contracts); see also Paglin, supra note 306, at 64 (discussing the role
of intent in determining the existence of a contract, and when intention cannot be
revealed from the contract's terms or the circumstances surrounding its execution,
the court may impose non-consensual liability for reasons of justice and
efficiency).
311. Kenny, supra note 139, at 463.
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programs through advertisements or product displays, and
environmentally conscious company stakeholders rely on those
public representations when they engage in the behavior solicited by
them by buying the company's products or investing in them. 3 12
Third party beneficiary status can be denied if the claimants could
have protected their interest by participating in the formation of the
contract.3 13 However here, where the company's stakeholders did not
have an opportunity to bargain with the company, the trade
association or the government on the design of a CSR program, let
alone their rights under such programs, that rationale should not be a
More
basis for denying them third party beneficiary status.
there
that
problematic for using a third party beneficiary approach is
are no consequences (i.e. sanctions) for the company that fails to
comply with the terms of its CSR programs 314 and the company has
not conveyed to its stakeholders that it intended the terms, let alone
the goals of its CSR initiative, to be legally binding on it. 3 15
312. But cf Paglin, supra note 306, at 84 (discussing the problems with relying
on the reliance doctrine as a "rationale[] underlying the right to enforce promises"
for third party beneficiaries). These problems include the reasonableness of the
third party beneficiary's reliance on the promises made by the promisor, and "the
promisor's ability to foresee the reliance, the form it assumes, and most
importantly, the identity of the third party who relies on his promise." Id. at 89-90,
96 (emphasis added). Again, assuming use of reliance to identify legitimate third
party beneficiaries each of these problems seems surmountable in the case of a
company's promises to improve its environmental performance by adopting certain
programs.
313. See id at 97 ("whenever the third party is capable of protecting his interests
in the relationship with the promisee, without substantially increasing transaction
costs or otherwise adversely affecting his interests, he should not be awarded relief
as a third party").
314. Some trade association information disclosure programs threaten to expel
members who do not comply with the initiatives' requirements. Even the
government sponsored programs do not have sanctions for failing to perform. See
Strasser, supra note 134, at 551-54.
315. Kenny, supra note 139, at 467; Paglin, supra note 306, at 93 (saying that
another reason why substituting the reliance test for intention is problematic is that
even though "the promisor may foresee some act of reliance by a third party" on his
representations, "he does not contemplate his own liability as a result"). Not
discussed in this article is yet another problem that flows from the promisor's lack
of foreseeability about his own liability to a third party is that affect of holding the
company liable will have on "the future bargaining behavior of similarly situated
parties," for example the effect on transaction costs. See id. at 105 (applying an
economic model of enforcing promises that looks at "the adaptive behavior of
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However, given that contract law favors construction of contracts in a
way that fulfills their public interest objective 3 16-here the public
interest in a clean environment-then perhaps a court would not
allow this latter concern, the principal purpose of which is to shield
the contracting party from a liability that she did not know she had, to
bar a stakeholder from enforcing these agreements.3 17
An appeal of using contract principles to compel compliance with
representations by business about the effectiveness of their CSR
programs and their good environmental behavior is the unambiguous
public purpose norm behind enforcement of contracts. 3 18 There is a

promisors and promisees in response to distinct rules of liability" to see if the
model offers better "criteria for the recognition of a third party's right to enforce a
contract").
316. 5-24 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.25; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 207 ("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof, a meaning that serves the public interest is generally
preferred.").
317. See also Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the
Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1209 (1985) (pointing out
that the third party beneficiary rule is an evolutionary rule that has both
revolutionized and socialized contract law. "'The eventual triumph of the third
party beneficiary idea may be looked on as still another instance of the progressive
liberalization or erosion of the rigid rules of the late nineteenth century theory of
contractual obligation .

...

To the nineteenth century legal mind the propositions

that no man was his brother's keeper, that the race was to the swift and that the
devil should take the hindmost seemed not only obvious but morally right. The
most striking feature of nineteenth century contract theory is the narrow scope of
social duty which it implicitly assumed. In our own century we have witnessed
what it does not seem too fanciful to describe as a socialization of our theory of
contract. The progressive expansion of the range of non-parties allowed to sue as
contract beneficiaries as well as of the situations in which they have been allowed
to sue is one of the entries to be made in this ledger."' (quoting F. KESSLER & G.
GILMORE, CONTRACTS, CASES & MATERIALS, 1117, 1118 (2d ed. 1970))). In many
ways, this "socialization" of contract theory parallels the second iteration of the
CSR movement, in which the moral obligation on business to be a good corporate
citizen became once again a norm. See supra Part III (discussing the origins of the
modem corporate social responsibility movement).
318. Russell, supra note 19, at 572 ("[E]nforcement for "breach of private
promises creates an incentive for the parties to perform their promises."). In
contrast, see Babcock, Assuming PersonalResponsibility, supra note 5, at 151-52
(discussing the possibility that "the abstract environmental protection norm may
not be sufficiently robust or widely enough held" to surmount other barriers to
responsible environmental behavior).
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clear societal benefit from promises being kept 31 9 because when
"contracts are secure . . . markets flourish, maximizing wealth as well
as robust exchanges." 320 The strong possibility that a suit for breach
of contract will be brought by the injured party makes compliance
with the terms of the contract more likely, and "the injured party ...
a good surrogate for the public interest in contracting." 3 2 1 "[T]he law
depends on an injured party" in a breach of contract situation "to
enforce his own rights, and thus protect not only his own interest, but
also the incentives of all to contract and to perform their contractual
commitments." 322 Promises that have been made to the company's
stakeholders, such as the promises made in these CSR initiatives,
serve an additional underlying public purpose, as noted previously,
making these agreements of even more importance than contracts
between two private parties.323 State courts are open to such
lawsuits, and, unlike third party suits to enforce federal regulatory
permits, which face multiple jurisdictional barriers before a court will
reach the suit's merits, the hurdles in a suit for breach of contract are
largely restricted to the merits of maintaining such an action.
The mere threat of bringing one of these lawsuits might reform
corporate behavior.324 Businesses are generally litigation adverse
because of the unnecessary expense of defending against them in
court as well as the unwanted public attention that such lawsuits

319. Russell, supra note 19, at 573 ( "The public purpose in enforcing contracts
is clear.")
320. Id.; see also id ("The payoff for society is not the enhanced wealth of a
particular transaction, but rather, the reliability of commitment and the enhanced
wealth that flows from flourishing markets."); id. at 57 ("Enforcement of private
contract produces a derivative effect of belief in the power of contracts, and, thus, a
robust economy.").
321. See id at 574 ("[T]he law enforces promises by respecting the allocated
benefits of the deal").
322. Id. at 573.
323. Id. at 575 (such contracts are "of greater significance than contracts between
two individuals").
324. Kenny, supra note 139, at 469 (describing the response of Wal-Mart to a
class action lawsuit brought by foreign workers for breach of contract as third party
beneficiaries of the store's contracts with garment suppliers in the respective
countries where the company's CEO warned suppliers that Wal-Mart would start
holding them "more accountable for environmental and social standards at foreign
factories as public expectations in the United States rise").
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generate.325 "The mere lodging of allegations in the complaint
creates results because the allegations garner public and private
attention." 326 When the complainant is a grassroots organization, the
lawsuit "can have the double effect of changing public opinion while
also hitting the corporation where it truly matters-in its pocket
books." 327 A lawsuit also raises the possibility of settlement where
structural changes can be made in a business' operations to include
more robust CSR programs.
If environmental CSR programs were properly designed and
enforced, they might well improve the regulatory compliance record
of firms that use them and even induce some firms to go beyond
compliance. But their design defects mean that the programs will do
little to reform corporate environmental behavior, and that the public
will receive minimal, if any, benefit from their existence; instead
their benefits will primarily inure to the businesses that employ them.
Since there is a low probability that companies have a sincere interest
in truly effective CSR programs because of the substantial costs
associated with improving their design, only external compulsion
creates any chance that these initiatives could be a meaningful
supplement to existing regulatory programs. This part of the article
has proposed a rationale for EPA incorporating CSR programs into
regulatory permits, which will allow the agency to cure their design
defects and make the programs judicially enforceable. Alternatively,
contract principles, especially warranty, are offered as an alternative
way to achieve these same results. These proposals are novel, to say
the least; the intent in proposing them is to start a discussion. But, if
environmental CSR initiatives cannot be improved and cannot be
made enforceable, then they should be exposed for what they are325. See id. at 473 ("[E]ven when a company denies wrongdoing, the mere
continued threat of litigation and the negative stigma it creates can be enough to
settle a case.").
326. Id. at 469-70. One possible negative reaction to the threat of litigation is
that companies who adopted these various CSR initiatives "as public relation
devices," with no intent that they be binding or create any legal liability, may
amend the initiatives to make this fact clear by expunging any language that could
create the counter impression. See id at 455 (saying that lawsuits, such as the class
action lawsuit filed against Wal-Mart, are "likely to cause alarm" because
companies who have such codes "never expected that some one would take . .. [it]
seriously and use it as an affirmative tool to actually make them do what they
promised to do").
327. Id. at 473.
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corporate flim-flam-and should not receive any government
encouragement or public support.
CONCLUSION

This article has examined the concept of corporate social
responsibility as it applies to the environmental activities of
businesses. The idea behind the broader concept is that companies
voluntarily reform their behavior by engaging in socially beneficial
activities and refraining from behavior that has negative social
impacts.
The CSR movement has put down roots in the
environmental area, but there is suspicion about the genuineness of
the movement and concern that it may be a not-so-transparent attempt
to replace regulatory requirements. However, if environmental CSR
programs could fill the gaps in the regulatory net and take some of
the pressure off of inadequate government enforcement programs by
inducing companies not only to meet regulatory requirements, but
also to go beyond them, then this article suggests that they are worth
looking at more closely.
The article does that by examining three environmental CSR
initiatives-information disclosure, voluntary performance standards,
and environmental management systems-and discusses what each
might achieve. However, it is clear from independent studies of their
efficacy that claims of their effectiveness are way over-blown. From
these studies, the article identifies three design flaws of particular
concern-the absence of monitoring of program performance, the
lack of public transparency about their effectiveness, and the dearth
of sanctions for non-compliance with them- and shows why it is
unlikely that companies will redesign them without some external
compulsion. But unless these design flaws are corrected, their
promise of reforming corporate environmental behavior and
improving the extant level of environmental protection will be a
chimera; a public relations coup for businesses.
The article suggests that external compulsion might come from the
government requiring companies to incorporate well-designed CSR
initiatives into their environmental permits as a condition of receiving
the benefits of participating in a government sponsored CSR
program. This, in turn, would make the programs enforceable by the
company's stakeholders, including local communities and
environmental organizations. Another possible way to secure their
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enforcement, and possible reform, is through the application of
contract principles to them. Although neither approach is problem
free, the mere threat of litigation, which each offers, and the resultant
costs and reputational harm to the company whose fraudulent
behavior will be thus publicly exposed, might move businesses to
adopt and actually implement programs that are more meaningful.
Once reformed, environmental CSR programs, such as those
discussed in the article, may in fact change corporate environmental
behavior and improve the quality of the environment, thus benefitting
society at large and earning for the companies the right to wear the
corporate social responsibility label.

